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THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE
BRITISH OIL INDUSTRY*
William H. Millard**
I. INTRODUCTION
The recovery of resources from the North Sea Continental Shelf
has given seven nations which traditionally have been oil and gas con-
sumers the opportunity to become producers of energy sources. In the
period following the unexpected discoveries during the late 1950's, the
governments of these nations have been compelled to rapidly develop
legal systems providing for immediate exploration and production in
the region. Control over the shelf has been divided among the nations
by asserted boundary lines and, internally, each nation has established
its right to control the exploitation of resources by enacting national
acts of ownership. Once armed with a right of control, the nations cre-
ated legal relationships between their governments and the oil compa-
nies they hoped to attract to the area. Methods of allocating portions of
the shelf to the oil companies for production purposes were devised, as
were tax regimes to assure that some of the companies' success is
shared with the nation. Over the years, the legal systems have matured,
and as the North Sea oil industry has changed, the systems have been
altered to accommodate the industry.
This Article explores the development of the legal system provided
for North Sea oil and gas in the United Kingdom, focusing particularly
on the laws and regulations that affect American oil companies operat-
ing in the British sector. Throughout the Article, attention is given to
the policy issues that caused the British government to make certain
decisions. Additionally, this Article demonstrates that political and
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economic policies are especially important in determining the United
Kingdom's method of licensing oil companies for production rights and
in the decision to form the state-owned British National Oil Corpora-
tion (BNOC) to directly compete with the private oil industry. The last
section of the Article considers the effect of changes in laws and legal
relationships on the British oil industry, with analysis centering on the
government's decision requiring oil companies to renegotiate existing
licenses to provide for increased state participation through BNOC.
An understanding of the variables that cause the British to adopt cer-
tain policy, and consequently to enact certain law, will aid in predicting
changes in the law and thus render the legal environment more secure.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
The discovery of hydrocarbons in the continental shelf below the
North Sea has had a tremendous impact on many sectors of the world.
For some of the seven European countries in the North Sea region,
production has meant an unanticipated boost for their economies. For
oil companies from around the world, the North Sea offers a much-
needed new supply in a. region that is politically stable. Finally, for
neighboring European nations, the North Sea production presents at
least the opportunity to have an energy source other than the OPEC
countries.
Since 1964, when Britain took initial steps toward developing a
legal environment for offshore exploration and development,' industry
growth has been impressive. With an early goal of rapid exploration,
the British have effectively used a licensing scheme to attract oil com-
panies from around the world to operate in their portion of the conti-
nental shelf.2 In only sixteen years, offshore production of oil in the
United Kingdom had grown from nothing to a 1980 figure of 1.7 mil-
lion barrels per day-an amount which exceeds British consumption.3
Proven reserves in the U.K. continental shelf are set at twelve billion
barrels, while probable and possible reserves have been estimated to
1. See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29.
2. Address by J.D.A. Evans, a Managing Director of British National Oil Corporation
(BNOC), before the Society of Petroleum Engineers of A.I.M.E., 1981 S.P.E. Hydrocarbon Eco-
nomics and Evaluation Symposium, S.P.E. No. 9543 (Feb. 26, 1981) [hereinafter referred to as
Evans]. Presently, there are over 200 licensees holding rights to more than 200,000 square kilome-
ters. Id
3. Id
1983]
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equal roughly that amount.4  Twenty-six fields have been declared
commercial and sixteen now are in production.5
Britain's sagging economy also has heightened the importance of
North Sea oil. In 1974, the cost of oil imports accounted for over a
quarter of a record deficit in the nation's balance of payments.6 By
1980, however, British oil production was credited with saving about 6
billion pounds or 14 billion dollars, and creating a surplus account of
2.3 billion pounds or 5.3 billion dollars.7 Additionally, oil production
comprised about seven and one-half percent of the total industrial in-
vestment in Britain from 1975 to 1979, and by 1981 accounted for
about four percent of the nation's gross national product. 8 Currently,
for the first time, Britain has actually become a net exporter of petro-
leum.9 The oil industry also has provided a valuable new source of
jobs in both the production area and in the industries servicing the oil
companies.
The British were well aware that a policy of rapid exploration
would require a large amount of participation by foreign oil firms. The
two largest British companies, British Petroleum and the Royal Dutch-
Shell group, quickly became active participants, but they alone were
not able to develop the shelf.'0 In 1981, about sixty percent of the
North Sea activity was controlled by foreign oil companies, with Amer-
icans accounting for fifty percent of the total." Considering the ad-
vanced state of the American oil industry, the fact that British interests
are responsible for more than forty percent of the activity is an impres-
sive aspect of the government's licensing system. 12 Initially, nearly all
4. Quinlan, U.K North Sea-Development slowing down, 49 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, 233,
233 (1982).
5. Evans, supra note 2. The production figures are even more impressive upon noting that
the first oil field was discovered in 1969 at the Montrose Field and that production was delayed
until 1975. Production was first obtained at the Argyll Field. Id
6. Id
7. Id The British export about one-half of the oil they produce. Id
8. In 1975, oil accounted for only a negligible portion of the British gross national product.
Evans, supra note 2.
9. Davis, Why the North Sea bubble burst, The Times (London), Apr. 30, 1982, at 17, col. 2.
10. G. ARNOLD, B~rrArN's OIL 42 (1978). The Shell group is comprised of 60% Dutch inter-
ests and 40% British interests. In 1973, 35% of the discoveries were in areas held by British Petro-
leum and Shell. Id
11. Evans, supra note 2. A review of the American stake in the British sector of the continen-
tal shelf is available in the article, Who does best out OfAmerica's 43% of North Sea 0l, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 24, 1977, at 86.
12. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 47. Angus Beckett, civil servant in charge of oil policy
from 1964-1972, defends the size of British participation in the North Sea, citing the country's
lesser participation in other oil provinces. Id
[Vol. 18:394
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the services and technology for North Sea development originated
outside the United Kingdom-primarily from Norway, Japan, the
Netherlands, and Texas.
1 3
Participation in the British sector has been dominated by the seven
major international oil companies, 14 and more recently by the state-
owned BNOC. Active foreign independents included the United King-
dom subsidiaries held by Phillips, Conoco, Amerada, and Texas East-
ern. Small British independents have had a harder time establishing
their presence as only about 500,000 acres out of a total 17 million li-
censed are held by such British firms.15 While nearly 10,000 independ-
ents operate in the United States, there were only about 30 operating in
England in 1980.16 For independents, the only viable opportunity for
participation is through the formation of an operating consortium.
1 7
Although some potential members complain that they can never be-
come the operator of the consortium, the arrangement provides an op-
portunity to share in the success of development and gives voting
power in the operating committee proportionate to each member's
share. 18 Increasing the share of small British independents was one of
the goals of the Conservative Government in the seventh licensing
round in 1980-81,19 and the inclusion of small British independents in
operating consortia should become more common if the majors plan to
13. Id at 39. British industry was able to contribute only about five percent of the work
connected with opening the southern gas fields. Id The Netherlands' share was the result of its
controlling interest in Shell.
14. The major international oil companies generally are considered to include Exxon (includ-
ing its British subsidiary, Esso), Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Standard Oil of Indiana
(Amoco), Standard Oil of California, Gulf, Texaco, and Atlantic-Richfield (ARCO).
15. Ellis, Oilmen in bowler hats, FoRBEs, July 21, 1980, at 54-55. British independents control
only about three percent of proven reserves and one percent of proven gas. Id Certainly, the
primary cause of the low levels of activity by British independents is the scarce number of such
companies. Ellis attributes the poor achievement of the British independents in part to the former
Labour Government's policies which promoted BNOC at the expense of the independents. Id
16. Id The number of British independents has been increasing, however, as shown by the
results of the seventh round of licensing. Among the 119 companies receiving licenses were 72
British companies, many of which were independents. The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1981, at 21,
col. 4.
17. See Woodliffe, State Particoation in the Development of United Kingdom Offshore Petro-
leum Resources, 1977 PUB. L.. 249, 252.
18. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 91. Cluff Oil, one of the more active British independ-
ents, claims that it was excluded from the fifth round of licensing due to its insistence on being an
operator. Id
The consortium arrangement also is used by the major firms. Shell and Esso are joint licen-
sees for four producing fields, including Brent, the largest development in the U.K. sector. Id at
85.
19. Ellis, supra note 15, at 54-55.
1983]
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receive new licenses.2°
As the magnitude of the success of British offshore development
becomes more apparent, and its implications for improving the econ-
omy better understood, companies should continue to expect active
regulation by the government, subject to changes that are perceived as
best for the nation. An appreciation of the British regulatory system
and an awareness of how and why it changes is extremely important.
III. NORTH SEA GEOGRAPHY
The North Sea encompasses 222,000 square miles (about 56,320
square kilometers) between the British Isles and the northwestern por-
tion of the European continent. Its often violent seas are bordered by
seven coastal states: the United Kingdom on the west, Norway in the
northeast, and Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and France, on the east.21 Of the seven countries, Great Britain enjoys
the largest coastal area along the sea. Commercially, the North Sea
region also is considered to include recent exploratory efforts west of
Great Britain, in the Celtic and Irish Seas, and the Western Ap-
proaches Basin between northwest France and southern England.
There are two large sedimentary basins found in the North Sea.22
In the southern portion, large natural gas fields have been found in the
region between the Netherlands and mid-Great Britain. In the north-
ern basin, located in the area between Norway, Scotland, and the
Shetland Islands, some of the most significant oil field discoveries in
recent years now are under development.
The entire seabed of the North Sea is the continental shelf of Eu-
rope. Generally, North Sea waters are shallow, with maximum depths
rarely exceeding 650 feet (200 meters). However, a pronounced excep-
tion is found off the southern coast of Norway where a trench, known
as the Norwegian Trough, reaches more than 1,000 feet deep. This
formation separates the Norwegian coast from some of the successful
oil fields within its jurisdiction.
20. Id
21. Young, Offshore Claims and Problems in the Norh Sea, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 505, 505
(1965).
22. D. KETo, LAW AND OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT. THE NORTH SEA EXPERIENCE 17
(1978).
[Vol. 18:394
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IV. ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION OVER THE NORTH SEA
CONTINENTAL SHELF
There are two claims to jurisdiction and ownership of North Sea
minerals relevant to companies seeking to explore and developthe re-
gion. The first is the claim establishing for each of the seven coastal
states exclusive jurisdiction over a portion of the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf. The second is the state's right of ownership of those minerals
found within the seabed of each jurisdiction. International law and
treaties firmly established the former, while national acts of sovereignty
are the basis of the latter.
A. Jurisdictional Division of the North Sea
No minerals in the North Sea Continental Shelf may be exploited
without express consent by one of the seven coastal states. In the early
1960's, when initial tests for hydrocarbons were giving positive results,
the oil companies and politicians began encouraging the governments
to formally assert control over portions of the continental shelf so that
exploration could legally get underway.23
Seeking international legal justification for dividing the continen-
tal shelf into separate exclusive jurisdictions, the seven nations relied
largely on principles set forth in the Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf of 1958 (Convention).24 Although only Britain and Den-
mark officially ratified the Convention before formally laying claim to
the seabed hydrocarbons, 25 the Convention's principles formed the ba-
sis of the various reciprocal agreements that established each country's
jurisdictional share.2 6 Rights set forth in the Geneva Convention and
23. Birnie & Mason, Oil and Gas The International Regime, in THE EFFECTIVE MANAGE-
MENT OF RESOURCES 21 (C. Mason ed. 1979).
24. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, reprintedin 1 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 101 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention].
25. Young, supra note 21, at 516. The United Kingdom ratified on May 11, 1964. Denmark
ratified on June 12, 1963. See generaly Brenscheidt, Petroleum Legislaton in the North Sea Coun-
tries, 11 Tax. INT'L L.J. 281 (1976) (discussing Continental Shelf Convention and petroleum legis-
lation/licensing policies of the United Kingdom, Denmark, West Germany, Norway, and the
Netherlands).
26. See Young, supra note 21, at 516.
The situation in the North Sea is thus largely governed at present by principles of gen-
eral international law and such agreements as there may be among the littoral states. It
does not seem, however, that major difficulties should arise because of the lack of direct
acceptance of the Geneva texts. The North Sea states appear prepared in general to
apply, on a basis of reciprocity, principles essentially the same as thoge framed at
Geneva.
[Vol. 18:394
7
Millard: The Legal Environment of the British Oil Industry
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
THE BRITISH OIL IND USTR Y
five separate agreements with North Sea states enabled the United
Kingdom to claim approximately forty-six percent of the seabed.27
Norway, with twenty-five percent, took the second largest share, even
though its population is nearly fifteen times less than Britain's.28
The United Kingdom found the terms of the Geneva Convention
very attractive. Britain easily qualified under either of the criteria set
forth in article 1 for asserting exclusive jurisdiction over a country's
continental shelf.29 Article 1 requires that a nation laying claim to a
seabed either show that the waters do not exceed a depth of 200 meters
or "beyond that limit, to where the depth of the supelJacent waters ad-
mits of the exploitation of the natural resources. 3 ° Obviously, how-
ever, in an enclosed area such as the North Sea, no one nation could
claim exclusive jurisdiction over a continental shelf that other nations
also could claim. Here, the principle of "equidistance," set forth in ar-
ticle 6, became relevant. Article 6 provides that where conflicting juris-
dictional claims are possible, the final boundaries are to be determined
by agreement between the parties or, in absence of agreement, accord-
ing to the point of equidistance from the coasts of the two states. 3
1
Although the United Kingdom was not adversely affected by the
principle of equidistance, commentators have criticized the British gov-
ernment's willingness to allow Norway to apply the principle without
assenting to the other terms of the Geneva Convention.32 Rather than
ratifying the Convention and possibly having the area beyond the Nor-
wegian Trough-but within the point of equidistance from the British
coast-declared British continental shelf, Norway chose to establish its
jurisdiction by separate agreements. On May 31, 1963, by royal decree,
Norway declared that it had sovereign jurisdiction over the seabed and
27. D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, THE PoLrrcAL ECONOMY OF NORTH SEA OIL 21 (1975)
(Table 2.1).
28. Id Britain's population is approximately 56 million. Norway's population totals about
four million. Id
29. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
30. Id
31. Id art. 6; see Brenscheidt, supra note 25, at 283. The equidistance principle proved a
source of legal conflict for states sharing one coastline. When West Germany was faced with
settling for a share smaller than it thought fair, it successfully received a ruling against Denmark
and the Netherlands from the International Court of Justice at The Hague. North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Denmark; Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969
IC.J. 3. The court held that since West Germany had not ratified the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf, it was not legally bound by the equidistance formula of art. 6. Id at 46-47. Subse-
quently, in 1971, the three countries entered agreements establishing continental shelfjurisdiction.
D. KETO, supra note 22, at 74.
32. See, eg., A. SAMPSON, SEVEN SisrERs: THE GREAT OIL COMPANIES AND THE WORLD
THEY MADE 177-84 (1975).
1983]
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subsoil "to such extent as the depth of the sea permits the utilization of
natural deposits, irrespective of any other territorial limits at sea, but
not beyond the median line in relation to other states. 33 In effect,
Norway was asserting that it would not permit the criteria of article I to
deny it any claim to the rich seabed lying beyond the Norwegian
Trough but within the point of equidistance from the British coast.
The United Kingdom assented to this boundary, the median line, by
entering into a 1965 treaty with Norway.34 The British government's
decision has been criticized as being one of its many "give-aways" of
North Sea rights.3 1 Mason believes Britain's assent was due primarily
to the fact that, at the time, the extent and value of the hydrocarbons in
the continental shelf were unknown.36 A dispute apparently would
have been far more likely if negotiations had concerned the allocation
of known resources.37 In addition, the British would have had little
chance for success had the suit gone before the International Court of
Justice where precedent indicated that nonsigners, such as Norway,
would not be bound by the Geneva Convention. Britain's position
would have been enhanced by international acceptance of the conti-
nental shelf doctrine and, at the time, Norway could not have shown
that the Norwegian Trough was technologically exploitable, thus termi-
nating its continental shelf where the Trough began. However, the
Norwegians had carefully refrained from laying claim to the continen-
tal shelf, choosing instead the "seabed. '38 Finally, it is highly unlikely
that oil companies would have been willing to operate in the disputed
area and Britain naturally was anxious to promote development of the
area.
Thus, Britain's share of the continental shelf was determined by
the points of equidistance from an adjacent nation's coast. The map
above shows the median lines that divide the continental shelf into
seven jurisdictions.
33. See D. KETO, supra note 22, at 70 (quoting from Norway, Ministry of Industry, Legisla-
lion Concerning the Continental She//with unofficial English translation, Royal Decree of May 3 1,
1963, at 9).
34. Treaty on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf. United Kingdom-Norway [1965],
551 U.N.T.S. 214.
35. See A. SAMpsoN, supra note 32, at 182.
36. Birnie & Mason, supra note 23, at 20.
37. Id at 19. It has been observed that the negotiations between the nations related to the
assignment ofjurisdiction, rather than the allocation of resources, a fact which allowed an agree-
ment to be reached relatively rapidly. Id
38. Id at 33.
[Vol. 18:394
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B. The Continental Shelf Act of 1964
The United Kingdom's Continental Shelf Act of 1964 implements
the rights made available by the Convention on the Continental Shelf
to control designated portions of the North Sea.3 9 The Act specifies
that "[a]ny rights exercisable by the United Kingdom outside territorial
waters with respect to the sea bed and subsoil and their natural re-
sources,. . . are hereby vested in Her Majesty."' The Act does not
purport to vest in the British government actual ownership of the sea-
bed resources. The British only claim the right to control, through ex-
clusive jurisdiction, the exploration and extraction of those resources.
This is a basic principle of the Geneva Convention. 41 The Act contin-
ues to respect the free character of the high seas, concerning itself solely
with jurisdiction over the shelf seabed.42
For private companies doing business in the United Kingdom con-
tinental shelf, it is significant that the Act has not attempted to nation-
alize the resources. Any company given permission to explore and
develop in the U.K. continental shelf will be recognized as having full,
legal ownership of the resources it extracts, despite the confusion that
the concept of nationalization causes some British politicians.43 How-
ever, legal ownership of extracted resources may be subject to numer-
ous governmental controls on the use of the extracted resources.44
The government's power to decide who shall have permission to
explore and develop in the U.K. continental shelf applies also to the
government itself which, as developer of a certain region, can conse-
quently enjoy full ownership of any resources it extracts. Although in
39. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29.
40. Id § 1(1).
41. Dam, Oiland Gas Licensing andthe North Sea, 8 J.L. & ECON. 51, 53 (1965). The Conti-
nental Shelf Convention gives coastal states sovereign rights over their portions of the shelf to
explore and exploit the resources. These rights are "exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these
activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal
State." Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 2(l)-(2).
42. Article 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention provides: "The rights of the coastal State
over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or
that of the airspace above those waters." Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 3. See
generally Woodliffe, North Sea Oil and Gas-The European Community Connection, 12 COMMON
MKT. L. Rav. 7, 12-24 (1976) (discussing Continental Shelf Act in conjunction with Britain's rela-
tionship with other North Sea countries).
43. An example of this confusion is found in the Labour Government's "'White Paper,"
UNrrED KIN oDOM OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS POLICY, CMD. 5696 (1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIA.S 460-63 (1975), where the statement is made: "Britain's oil is of course already
publicly owned." Id at 460.
44. See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
1983]
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1964 only private oil companies had the capacity to begin immediate
exploration, in 1975 the Labour Government created the BNOC, with
an express purpose of exploring for and recovering petroleum on be-
half of the nation 5.4  In 1980, BNOC was the principal operating part-
ner in a consortium exploring in the Rockwall Trough off west
Scotland. In the future, the British can be expected to continue to take
advantage of this direct national ownership of a share of the petroleum
recovered by an operating consortium, as long as it remains possible to
finance the BNOC's participation. It is significant, however, that the
government's basic rights to ownership are no different than any pri-
vate company's.
Three previous actions seemingly provide legal precedent for the
control Britain established over the continental shelf through its 1964
Act. The first and most explicit precedent is the resolution of the Ge-
neva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958.46 The second ac-
tion, the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf,4 7 was actually
precedent for both the Geneva Convention and the British Act. Presi-
dent Truman's proclamation gave the United States "jurisdiction and
control" over all natural resources and subsoil of the continental shelf
appurtenant to the United States.48 The Truman Proclamation was the
first such action, by any nation, declaring its control over the continen-
tal shelf region lying outside its traditional territorial waters. Like the
1964 British Act, the Truman Proclamation resulted from active en-
couragement by oil companies to establish some legal basis for devel-
oping offshore petroleum resources.49 The Truman Proclamation cited
no specific legal precedent, stating only that the action was reasonable
for developing offshore resources. 50 National jurisdiction over the ap-
purtenant continental shelf was necessary, the proclamation declared,
"in the interest of [resource] conservation and prudent utilization."'
The Truman Proclamation soon became legal precedent as other na-
45. See Evans, supra note 2. "More than any other comipany, we are bound to give priority
to the U.K. continental shelf and many people quite reasonably expect us to be continuing to
explore and produce in the [shell], even when the rest of the industry may be tempted to move to
other provinces." Id
46. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24; see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying
text.
47. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
48. Id
49. See D. KITo, supra note 22, at 64.
50. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
51. Id
[Vol. 18:394
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tions quickly made similar pronouncements. 2
The third legal precedent, the Petroleum (Production) Act of
1934, 53 is the British law vesting in the Crown all property rights in
subsurface minerals on land or in territorial waters.54 Private compa-
nies, when licensed, could explore for and develop petroleum under the
terms of the Act.55 Commentators Daintith and Gault claim that un-
certainty under prior British law regarding who held the property rights
to subsurface minerals necessitated the passing of the Act.56 Establish-
ing a governmental licensing regime was viewed as a way to "organise
and control exploration and production so as to avoid the disorder and
waste of the competitive drilling by which the U.S. oil scene had been
disfigured in the early part of this century." 57 In addition to the accept-
ance of the principle of national rights of control from the 1934 Act by
the 1964 Act, some of the specific licensing provisions were also
adopted.58
C. Jurisdictional Issues: Choice of Law
Section 3 of the Continental Shelf Act establishes that the civil law
of the United Kingdom applies to acts or omissions that take place on
or within 500 meters of an "installation in a designated area. ' 59 The
"designated area" is Britain's continental shelf region, outside of terri-
torial waters, that was officially specified in the Continental Shelf
(Designation of Areas) Order 1964(a). 60 Anyone doing business in the
British sector should be aware of which regional law applies within the
United Kingdom. Through a Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order,
the British sector is divided, along fifty-five degrees fifty minutes north
latitude, into Scottish and English sections.61 The respective laws of
52. D. KETO, supra note 22, at 65. Mexico made a similar proclamation within a month. Id
53. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36. The Act states, "The property
in petroleum existing in its natural condition... in Great Britain is hereby vested in His Maj-
esty." Id § 1(1).
54. Id
55. Id § 2(1).
56. Daintith & Gault, Facta Sunt Servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of North Sea Oil
Production, 8 CAMBRuN L. REv. 27, 28 (1977).
57. Id
58. See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 1(3), specifically adopting Petroleum (Produc-
tion) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, §§ 2-3, 5-6.
59. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 3(1); see also Morris, The North Sea Continental
She'." Oil and Gas Legal Problems, 2 I-r'L LAw. 191, 204 (1967) (applying to criminal law as
well). But see id at 205 n.72.
60. Continental Shelf (Designation of Areas) Order, 1964(a), No. 697.
61. Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order, 1964, No. 930.
19831
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Scotland and England apply in the two sections. 62 The area designated
as "Scottish" waters covers 62,500 square miles, nearly twice the size of
the 32,800 miles assigned as "English" waters.63
D. Framework/or Resolving International Boundary Disputes
The rule of capture, a general principle of oil and gas law, states
that where mineral deposits lie in a pool covering more than one tract
of land, either party is permitted to exploit as much of the resources as
possible.' There are indications that the rule of capture applies to
drilling in the British shelf.6 However, where a mineral deposit
stretches into two separate continental shelf jurisdictions, the rule of
capture alone will be an insufficient basis for resolving conflicts. Such
a situation becomes a border dispute, requiring reconciliation via inter-
national agreement.6
Pursuant to the Geneva Convention principle that a country owns
the right to exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf,67 gov-
ernments have acted quickly to license the shelf regions bordering me-
dian lines.6 8 In the United Kingdom, most of the blocks in the
northern region along the boundary with Norway were licensed in the
second, third, and fourth rounds.69 Norway followed a similar prac-
tice, leading Daintith and Gault to conclude that "[t]here was, clearly,
some concern that should a licensee on either side of the boundary line
discover a joint field, the other country should have a licensee in a posi-
tion to play some part in exploitation."70 When the massive Brent field
62. Id § 3(1).
63. See D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, supra note 27, at 24.
64. See Morris, supra note 59, at 206. "One who has the right to drill for and produce oil and
gas from a particular tract of land may so produce such hydrocarbons even though the oil or gas
so produced is drained from beneath the land of another." Id The rule was recognized in every
state in the United States and by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 670
(1895).
65. Morris, supra note 59, at 206. Morris bases his conclusion on the English case ofActon v.
Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843) (dealing with rights to underground water). Mo..ris,
supra note 59, at 206-09. In the absence of statutory modification, the rule ofActon v. Diundell
still appears to be the law today in England. See 39 HALISBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 242 (3d
ed. 1962).
66. Morris says in the event of drainage, then the rule of capture controls. Morris, upra note
59, at 210. However, this contradicts the notion of the Geneva Convention that each state has
control over its resources. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 2, § 2.
67. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 2.
68. See, eg., Daintith & Gault, Oiland Gas: NationalRegimes, in THE EFFECTIVE MANAGE-
MENT OF REsouRCEs 53, 63 (C. Mason ed. 1979) (noting that blocks along the Norwegian-British
border tended to be allocated first and blocks along the coast allocated later).
69. Id
70. Id
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was discovered by Shell and Esso on the United Kingdom side of the
median, Norway immediately announced that a Statoil/Mobil group
had been licensed to handle production in the Norwegian sector of the
field.71 Resolving this potential conflict over who is to obtain the re-
sources is important to both the nations involved and, of course, to the
companies holding licenses on each side of the boundary. The best
method of resolution would be through an agreement between the two
sides.
Onorato identifies two ways to resolve the potential conflict be-
tween nations finding one pool of reserves straddling an international
boundary.72 The first, which has generally been rejected from consid-
eration, is the "unity of deposit" concept.73 According to this theory, it
is most important to maximize production by leaving the entire deposit
under the authority of the nation that discovered it. Rather than per-
mitting the median line to bisect the field and divide its ownership, it is
argued thatthe "special circumstance" clause of article 6 of the Geneva
Convention74 would permit an agreement between nations to redraw
the boundary lines. 75 Others, however, reject this interpretation of arti-
cle 6, arguing that the Geneva Convention is silent on this issue.76 In
the North Sea case involving West Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, Judge Ammoun held that "if the preservation of the unity
of deposit is a matter of concern to the Parties, they must provide for
this by voluntary agreement. 77 One can imagine the difficulty that
Norway and Britain would have in deciding who was to receive the
successful oil fields along their northern boundary, especially when the
magnitude of the discoveries became fully understood. Onorato also
agrees that "[tlime and practice. . . has now proved conclusively that
[unity of deposit] is not an approach that has been accepted or will be
71. Id
72. Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit, 26 INT'L &
Comr. L.Q. 324, 324-25 (1977).
73. Id at 325.
74. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 24, art. 6.
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining
to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In absence of agree-
ment, and unless a boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary line
is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Id
75. Onorato, supra note 72, at 325.
76. See Birnie & Mason, supra note 23, at 41.
77. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 LCJ. 3.
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followed."78
The second method suggested to resolve the possible conflict is
also by agreement. It calls for recognizing that the field straddling an
international boundary is the "joint property" of both countries.7 9 In-
ternational agreements generally have followed this approach.80
The British have entered into a series-of bilateral treaties on the
issue, establishing their rights with Norway, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, and West Germany.81 In most cases, the treaties are little more
than an agreement to agree--whenever the problem should arise-on
some way of dividing the field such that competition is reduced, and
exploration and exploitation are maximized. 82 In the agreement be-
tween the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the language of arti-
cle 1 shows this goal of maximizing the recovery from the field.
[I1f any single geological mineral, oil or natural gas structure
or field extends across the dividing line and the part of such
structure or field which is situated wholly on one side of the
dividing line is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other
side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties will seek to
reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or
field shall most effectively be exploited and the manner in
which the costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be appor-
tioned, after having invited the licensees concerned, if any, to
submit agreed proposals to this effect. 3
A significant aspect of this language is that, while an agreement is for-
malized between two governments, the terms of the agreement would
most likely be those worked out between the real parties in interest--
the companies holding the licenses.
78. Onorato, supra note 72, at 325.
79. Id
80. Id
81. The bilateral treaties Britain has entered into include the (I) Agreement between the
United Kingdom and Norway relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the
two countries, June 25, 1965, 1967 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 2757); (2) Agreement between the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea between the two countries, Dec. 23, 1966, 1967 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 23 (Cmd. 3253);
(3) Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands relating to the Exploitation of
Single Geological Structures extending across the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea, Dec. 23, 1966, 1967 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 24 (Cmd. 3254); (4) Agreement between the
United Kingdom and Denmark relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the
two countries, Feb. 6, 1967, 1967 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 35 (Cmd. 3278). Other treaties may be found
at Onorato, supra note 72, at 325 n.6.
82. Birnie & Mason, supra note 23, at 42.
83. Agreement between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom relating to the Delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea between the two countries, Dec. 23, 1966, art. 1,
1967 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 23 (Cmd. 3253).
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The British agreements with Norway and Denmark are delimita-
tion agreements and each contains an article addressing this problem.8 4
The agreements differ somewhat in that the Danes only wanted to
agree on a manner of exploiting, leaving the other terms to subsequent,
detailed agreement, while the British and Norwegians provided for a
format for reaching agreement, including consultation with licensees. 85
Neither agreement discusses arbitration. Birnie and Mason note, how-
ever, that its absence does not mean that arbitration is rejected.8 6
As an outgrowth of these treaties, there are two agreements, be-
tween the British and the Norwegians, which carry out the principles of
their treaty: the Norwegian-British Pipeline Agreement of 197387 and
the Frigg Gas Field Agreement of 1976.88 The Frigg Field Agreement
is a likely model for use in other similar situations.89 Its guiding princi-
ple was that the gas field, despite lying in both Norway-and British
sectors, was to be exploited as one unit.90 The apportionment of the
gas reserves was settled on a pro rata basis according to the amount of
the field on each side of the boundary, as determined by surveys.91 The
terms of the agreement also provide for periodic reviews of the
determinations.92
An interesting aspect of the delimitation agreements is the effect
they have internally on the signees. In Britain, the agreement "cannot,
in and of itself, bind private parties such as the licensees." 93 The Brit-
ish, however, found a way to make the terms binding by providing in
their petroleum production regulations that the government shall be
able to instruct licensees when fields cross an international median
line.94 The Norwegians did not need the indirect approach; the Norwe-
gian Royal Decrees of 1965 and 1972 provide that the Ministry of In-
dustry may issue such rules as may be required "'in regard to the
84. Onorato, supra note 72, at 325 n.6 (British treaties with Norway and Denmark).
85. See Birnie & Mason, supra note 23, at 43.
86. Id
87. Norwegian-British Pipeline Agreement, 1973.
88. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway relating to the Exploitation of the
Frigg Field Reservoir and the transmission of gas therefrom to the United Kingdom [hereinafter
cited as Frigg Field Agreement]; see Onorato, supra note 72, at 326 n.9.
89. See generally Woodliffe, International Uniilsatton of an Offshore GaT Field, 26 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 338 (1977) (discussing in detail the Frigg Field Agreement).
90. See Frigg Field Agreement, supra note 88, art. 1.
91. See Birnie & Mason, supra note 23, at 45.
92. Id
93. Daintith & Gault, supra note 56, at 64.
94. Id Daintith and Gault state that this was accomplished in the Petroleum (Production)
Regulations of 1966 and 1976. Id
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manner in which. . exploitation of petroleum shall. . . be carried
out.' ,95
V. ALLOCATION OF BRITISH OFFSHORE RESOURCES
A. Method of Allocation-Licensing of Operators
In addition to establishing the British government's jurisdiction
over seabed resources, the Continental Shelf Act of 1964 provides for
the mechanics of allocation. In section 1(3) of the Act, specific applica-
tions of sections of the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934, pertaining
to the granting of licenses "to search and bore for, and get, petro-
leum,"96 are adopted for the North Sea shelf.97 The 1964 Act does not
provide for the details of licensing, but rather made the 1934 Act appli-
cable because it provides for the issuance of regulations by the Ministry
of Power (subsequently changed to the Department of Energy).98 The
regulations contain model clauses dictating the terms, rights, and duties
of parties granted a license. A company wishing to do business in the
British continental shelf must turn to these frequently changing clauses
for guidance. 99
Licensing of private companies is common whenever the govern-
ment owns the resources but not the means to recover them. 00 In most
situations, a government will have no choice but to rely on the expertise
of the private petroleum companies for development of its resources.'01
However, the granting of a license is intended to be beneficial to both
parties. For the company, there is the opportunity to own the petro-
leum it extracts; for the government, the chance to take advantage of
what Dam calls "economic rent."' 2 Recovery of economic rent may
be in the form of a large monetary payment that bolsters the Treasury,
or compliance by the companies with certain conditions, or even the
requirement of immediate development that benefits many sectors of
the economy. In Britain, licensing was apparently the only system
95. Id (citing Norwegian Royal Decrees of 1965 and 1972, §§ 37-38).
96. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 2(1).
97. See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 1(3).
98. See id § 1(6).
99. See generally Morris, supra note 59, at 199-202 (discussing specific regulations promul-
gated by the Minister of Power).
100. K. DAM, OIL RnsouRcEs: Wno GETs WHAT How? 4 (1976).
101. Id at 3-4.
102. See id at 4. "[W]here the value of the resources exceeds all relevant costs, including the
costs of management and an appropriate risk premium for capital, then one may refer to the
difference as the economic rent enjoyed by the licensee." Id
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given serious consideration for exploring and developing the North Sea
shelf.10 3
The British chose a form of licensing termed by Dam as the "dis-
cretionary allocation system."'"3° Under the discretionary system, the
government licenses private companies, or, where possible, a state-
owned energy firm, based on the company's ability to satisfy the gov-
ernment that it can most effectively meet the set of criteria regarded as
important by the government.10 5 This is the most prevalent form of
licensing in the world,l06 which is not surprising since it features the
strongest elements of governmental control. The other form of licens-
ing, the "auction" or "competitive bidding" system, is primarily found
only in the United States.10 7 This system is not based on the ability of
the company to meet government criteria, but simply on its ability to
offer the highest monetary bid to purchase the lease rights.
B. Why the British Chose the Discretionary System
In the early 1960's, the British government had no idea how suc-
cessful North Sea oil and gas development would become. The Conti-
nental Shelf Act was passed at a time when optimism was high over the
1959 discovery of a natural gas field in the Groningen Province of the
Netherlands. However, at the time, there was no indication that suc-
cessful oil discoveries would occur in the north in a few years. Thus,
despite the optimism, in 1964 the choppy North Sea remained very
much an uncertainty. The oil companies were anxious to have a legal
basis for operations, but continued to make low estimates of possible
reserves, while emphasizing the high costs, dangers, and risks involved
103. Dam, supra note 41, at 54.
The main outlines of the United Kingdom system for exploitation were undoubtedly
determined as much by tradition as by logic. Exploration for and production of petro-
leum on public lands in most countries has traditionally been carried out by private
companies under license from government. And some form of charge based upon the
value of production, whether or not denominated a royalty, has traditionally been an
element of the consideration derived by the licensing body. Thus, while some Labour
Party voices were heard in favor of the exploitation of the North Sea resources by the
government itself or by one of its nationalized industries, the Conservative government
presumably gave little consideration to such an alternative and it adopted the usual ar-
rangement of licensing private companies. Even the Labour government, which came to
power in 1964 shortly after the system had been instituted, did not seek to change it
1d at 54-55.
104. See K. D'm, supra note 100, at 7.
105. Id at 4.
106. Id
107. Id
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in North Sea searches. 108 Against this background, the United King-
dom, then under Conservative control, wanted to achieve full explora-
tion of the British sector as quickly as possible.
In a 1977 report to a United States Senate subcommittee, Edward
Krapels identified the problem facing the British government as two-
fold.1°9 First, there was a feeling that, relative to other areas of the
world and because of the unproven state of the area, the North Sea
would not be attractive enough to entice private oil companies to tie up
the large amounts of capital needed for such risky and expensive ven-
tures."10 Secondly, the government, perhaps itself doubting the North
Sea potential, did not want to jeopardize the foreign interests of British
companies with "onerous financial terms" that might incite "OPEC
countries to follow suit, to the detriment of our. . . overseas oil interest
and balance of payments."'
Although the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934 had provided
for a system of licensing, the insignificance of the onshore oil industry
had never caused it much public scrutiny. This permitted the Con-
servative Government not to feel bound by the previous regulations in
designing terms for the North Sea. The government obviously felt
more confident in meeting its objectives by utilizing the discretionary
system instead of the competitive bidding approach." 2 The discretion-
ary system was selected because:
[Ilt was judged in 1964 that, in the unproven North Sea, com-
petitive bidding would be unlikely to lead to full and thor-
ough exploration, and it was thought that bids might well
have been small, and confined to strictly limited areas, and
that British participation might well have been less than was
possible to achieve under a discretionary system. . . . Under
a discretionary system, the Department felt that they would
108. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 36. Even though Slochteran was destined to become
the second largest gas field, its development was not an easy task. The twenty-mile area field "was
only discovered after a program lasting thirteen years in which 200 wells were drilled." Id
109. E. KRAPELS, SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONe., 1ST
SESS., CONTROLLING OIL: BRITISH OIL POLICY AND THE BRITISH NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION
7-8 (Comm. Print 1977).
110. Id at7.
111. See id at 7-8. Lord Balogh, a critic of the government's initial energy policy, responds
that British efforts to appease the Arabs are unnecessary. Labeling the fact that Arabs are influ.
enced by British behavior "the imperial syndrome," he says, "in fact, of course, the Arabs have
experts who have forgotten more than the Foreign Office ever knew and who could, and should be
employed to advise the Petroleum Department on how to obtain maximum benefit for the coun-
try." Balogh, The North Sea Blunder, BANxER, Mar. 1974, at 286.
112. See E. KRAPELs, supra note 109, at 8. Krapels notes that the British government experi-
mented with another allocation method in 1971, but retains the discretionary method. Id
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be able to insist, as a condition of a production license, that
the licensee carry out an effective work programme and also
to persuade him to buy British goods and services where they
were readily available. 13
In effect, the government chose to sell its economic rent, taking instead
the power for the Department of Energy to be able to select licensees
that best exemplify whatever characteristics it found to be important.
The Department of Energy has never been specific in how the var-
ious factors are weighed when it selects a licensee.114 Charges of "un-
fairness," which is one of the criticisms of a discretionary system,1 15
would seem hard to establish before an administrative review as long as
the standards remain tenuous. J.D.A. Evans, one of the managing di-
rectors of BNOC, cites typical factors as including a company's overall
competence, its financial strength, its technological ability, its willing-
ness to accept British unions, whether the firm is incorporated in Brit-
ain, whether it is small in size, and whether it has an overall desire to
contribute to the British economy.'16 Certainly, one of the most impor-
tant factors to the government is the degree of effectiveness and cooper-
ation a company exhibited during a- previous licensing term. This
process enables the government to most effectively enforce its condi-
tions and decrees.' 7
C. The Specjfcs of Licensing-Types and Terms
Section 6 of the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934 was specifi-
cally adopted in the Continental Shelf Act of 1964 and gives the gov-
ernment the power to make regulations prescribing the terms and
conditions that an applicant will be expected to meet."' Originally,
sections 2 and 6 of the 1934 Act provided for the Board of Trade to
handle licensing and the necessary regulations, 1" 9 but governmental re-
organization has subsequently granted that power to the Secretary of
113. Id
114. Id at 9.
115. Id at 8.
116. Interview with J.D.A. Evans, Managing Director, British National Oil Corporation, in
Dallas, Texas (Feb. 26, 1981); see E. K.APELs, supra note 109, at 8-9.
117. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 143 (discussing Amoco's exclusion from the fifth Ii-
censing round for refusing to comply with the government's insistence that all licensees negotiate a
participation agreement wti bffe BNOC). -
118. See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 1(3). Section 1(3) specifically adopts §§ 2 & 6
of the 1934 Act. Id
119. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, §§ 2, 6.
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State for Energy.1 20 Section 6 requires that regulations prescribe:
(a) the manner in which and the persons by whom applica-
tions for licenses under this Act may be made;
(b) the fees to be paid on any such application;
(c) the conditions as to the size and shape of areas in respect
of which licenses may be granted;
(d) model clauses which shall, unless the Board thinks fit to
modify or exclude them in any particular case, be incorpo-
rated in any such license; and different regulations may be
made for different kinds of licenses.1 21
One of the first actions taken by the Ministry of Power was to di-
vide the United Kingdom portion of the continental shelf into blocks of
250 square kilometers (approximately 100 square miles), which could
then be licensed, in differing allotments, to oil companies for develop-
ment.I22 A certain number of blocks would be offered in each specially
announced licensing "round," depending on the perceived need for
stimulating or limiting the amount of production. Certain blocks, se-
lected at the Department of Energy's discretion, would be made avail-
able in specially announced licensing "rounds." Companies were
encouraged to join together in operating groups in applying to develop
a block."2 In later rounds, operating consortia were required to pro-
vide for state participation by including the BNOC or the British Gas
Company. 24 Favorable treatment was also given to applicants that in-
cluded small British energy firms.125
Presently, the Department of Energy is engaged in its seventh
round of offshore licensing. Over 200,000 square kilometers have been
licensed to approximately 200 licensees. 26 Rounds have been held in
1964, 1965, 1970, 1971-72, 1977-78, 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1982-83.127
The British find the block system attractive because it preserves
the maximum amount of governmental control over production and
the private companies. By offering many small blocks instead of a
120. See Brenscheidt, supra note 25, at 297.
121. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 6.
122. Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations, 1964 STAT.
INST. No. 708.
123. Forming operating consortia is certainly the trend; however, British Petroleum was given
a license to develop the entire Forties Field without other companies.
124. The fifth, sixth and seventh rounds have required state participation as a condition to
receiving a license.
125. Oilmen in bowler hats, FoRBEs, July 21, 1980, at 54.
126. See Evans, supra note 2.
127. Id (information on total amount of area licensed and number of licenses awarded in first
seven rounds).
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large concession to a few companies, the British wanted to evoke the
widest possible interest in the North Sea by assuring that there would
be numerous prize winners of varying size. 128 The greater the number
of companies involved, the greater the effect North Sea shelf produc-
tion was expected to have on the various sectors of the British econ-
omy. Of course, the government also found it appealing that it could
control the rate of production by varying the amount of blocks it made
available when it decided that a round was necessary.
Initially, licenses were available only to British citizens or compa-
nies incorporated in the United Kingdom.129 American companies
were thus expected to have foreign subsidiaries incorporated in Great
Britain before they could expect to operate in the British sector of the
shelf. By 1976, however, the European Economic Community had
forced Britain to make a "modest retreat" from the strictly British re-
quirement. 3 According to 1976 regulations, licensing is available to
"any person."'' The British still require foreign companies to main-
tain a subsidiary in Great Britain and, as recently as 1976, continued to
include as grounds for revocation of a license the removal by a com-
pany of its central management and control from the country.13 2 Keto
notes that the government requires a local subsidiary in order to facili-
tate the assessment of taxes and the enforcement of regulations.
133
There are two kinds of licenses for which a company may apply:
exploration licenses and production licenses. The exploration license is
granted for a three-year period of nonexclusive exploration in desig- t-
nated areas.'34 The license is renewable and usually applies to areas
greater than the blocks assigned for production licenses. Exploration
licenses do not permit operations to be conducted in the areas reserved
under the exclusive production license. It is important to note that,
despite its name, the exploration license is really only applicable to pas-
sive forms of exploration, as drilling is not permitted to go beyond a
depth of 350 meters and only physical and chemical surveys of the seis-
mographic, geochemical, or magnetic nature are allowed.' 3  The
128. See Daintith & Gault, supra note 56, at 29.
129. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966, Reg. 4.
130. D. KETO, supra note 22, at 85.
131. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INsT. No. 1129, § 4, sched. 5, cl. 40(2)g,
& sched. 7, c. 21(2)f.
132. Id
133. D. KETO, supra note 22, at 85.
134. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966, sched. 5, cls. 2-4.
135. D. KETO, supra note 22, at 85.
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government finds the license particularly useful for its own gathering of
geological information, acquired through the Department of Energy's
power to demand that the license holder provide any information it
collects regarding the explored area.136
The production license is the most significant of the two forms of-
fered by the government. For the Department of Energy, it is the prin-
cipal legal means for asserting control over the activities of the private
companies and for recovering a share of the proceeds from successful
private efforts. 137 For the operating consortia, it is the only legal means
by which it can operate in the British continental shelf. A production
license provides, "Exclusive License and Liberty . . . to search and
bore for, and get petroleum in the seabed and subsoil" of a designated
100-mile block in the continental shelf.1 3' The successful applicant is
given six years of exclusive right to recover as much petroleum as it
can, before it must return at least one-half, chosen at its discretion, of
the block to the government for relicensing. 139 The remaining one-half
area may be renewed by the licensee for forty years of production or, if
it so desires, may be surrendered back to the Department. 140 The ini-
tial six-year period is actually very short by oil and gas production
standards, because it requires an immediate capital investment by the
companies in exploration and development facilities. Of course, this is
exactly what the government intended when it decided that immediate
production in the shelf was necessary. One of the fears that the British
had of the competitive bidding system of the United States was that oil
companies tend to plan their exploration budgets so that production is
delayed until just before the primary term of the lease is scheduled to
end. 4 ' The British desperately wanted to avoid what they considered
to be needless delays and thus chose provisions ordering the short-term,
mandatory forfeiture of one-half of the block. The goal was to attract
companies that would make North Sea shelf production an immediate
priority.
Undoubtedly, the most effective means that the British have for
136. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976, § 4, sched. 7, cl. 12(3).
137. D. KETo, supra note 22, at 85.
138. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966, Reg. 4, sched. 4, cl. 2.
139. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1980, reprinted in Barrow's Petroleum Legislation,
Supp. 56.
140. Id cls. 4, 6.
141. E. KRAPF.LS, supra note 109, at 8 (quoting a Department of Trade & Industry official,
May 1972: "I believe it to be the case that in auction systems people quite'often bid and hold
territory."). The delay rental clause contained in most oil and gas leases in America permits the
lessee to delay development until just before the primary term ends.
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forcing immediate production is through the requirement that each ap-
plicant must submit a detailed "work program." According to Dam,
the work program is the most competitive aspect of the discretionary
licensing system; the bigger and better the system, the greater the
chances of success.' 42 Before granting a production license, the com-
pany, or as the case may be, the operating consortium, is expected to
meet with Department of Energy officials so that they may "ascertain
what working obligations the various applicants may be willing to as-
sume.' 43 Thus, a company can expect the Department to be very ac-
tive in planning its work program, including the assuming of final
authority over such decisions as how many wells will be drilled in a
given block 1" and how exploratory drilling is to be carried out.
45
The fees assessed for a production license have also varied as dif-
ferent licensing rounds have been announced, but they are consistently
very low relative to what the government would receive under a com-
petitive bidding system. The regulations provide for a uniform appi-
cation fee of 1,000 pounds for all applicants and all blocks. 46 All other
fees are not statutorily based, but are determined by the Department of
Energy. Generally, an area fee has been assessed which increases
steadily over the number of years the licensee continues production.
For instance, in the fourth round, during 1971 and 1972, all licensees
were required to pay an initial area fee of forty-five pounds per square
kilometer. 47 In the seventh year, the fee increases to fifty pounds and
each year thereafter it increases by thirty pounds to a maximum of 350
pounds per square kilometer.' 48  The 350-pound figure is reached in
year seventeen. In the seventh round, in 1980, the Conservative Gov-
ernment assessed a five million pound per block fee for recipients of the
"own choice" blocks, a fee that is markedly higher than previous
rounds, but still considerably below the amount often brought in the
United States.149 It is not infrequent in competitive bidding to have
bids of over-one hundred million dollars, with nearly half of that "left
142. See K. DAM, supra note 100, at 28.
143. See Morris, supra note 59, at 202; Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966, sched. 4, cl.
12; Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976, sched. 4, cl. 14(1).
144. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 10.
145. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976, sched. 4, c. 14(1).
146. Id
147. This is about 11,250 pounds per block which, at an exchange rate of $2.40 per pound, is
only $27,000 for a 100-square mile block. See D. KETo, supra note 22, at 86.
148. 87,500 pounds per block.
149. UKseventh round larger than expected, 47 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 238, 238 (1980).
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on the table"-an amount higher than the second highest bid.15
The British government's intent is not to raise revenues through
the low fee structure, but, again, to speed up production.1 51 Companies
will have incentive to avoid the high annual fees that are incurred at an
increasing rate in the seventh year. Keto's assessment of the British
choice: "Britain has paid for this flexibility [control over licensing
terms] in foregone auction revenues, but continues to consider the ex-
change worthwhile." 152
D. Highlights of the Eight Licensing Rounds
1. The First Licensing Round-1964
In April of 1964, Britain's first round of licensing was announced
in the House of Commons by the Conservative Minister of Power, F.J.
Erroll.153 The round lasted from May 20 to July 20 of 1964, and in-
volved application requests for 960 blocks located chiefly in the south-
ern region of the British shelf, near the successful Slochteren field in
the Netherlands. The government placed no limit on the number of
blocks that could be included in a single license nor on the number of
licenses for which an applicant could apply. 5 4 The application was a
simple, two-page form that sought basic information on which the Min-
istry would follow up later. 5  The first round of licensing resulted in
applications for 394 blocks; fifty-three licenses were issued to twenty-
three different licensees, covering 348 blocks.15 6
The licensing criteria for the first round resembled policy state-
ments and set the tone for subsequent rounds by being very broad and
imprecise. However, the criteria did reflect the Conservative Govern-
ment's concern about foreign oil companies reaping too much of the
profits from Britain's continental shelf resources. The five criteria were
150. Interview with Harold Champagne, Atlantic Richfield Company, in Dallas, Texas (Mar.
4, 1981).
151. British revenues are earned primarily through a corporate tax, a petroleum revenue tax,
and a 12.5% royalty on all oil and gas sold. See D. KEro, supra note 22, at 86, 93-95.
152. Id at 88.
153. Rounds are officially announced by publication in the London Gazette. All important
dates and financial terms and a schedule of the blocks being offered in the first round were pub-
lished in the May 15, 1964 edition of the London Gazette.
154. See K. DAM, supra note 100, at 24. "The licenses [which were issued] ranged from one to
ten blocks in size. Many of the licensees were groups ofcompanies ... and... some 53 different
corporations or other legal persons were named in the licenses." id
155. Samples of applications for each round are reprinted in Petroleum Legislation
supplements.
156. See D. MACKAY & G. MAcKAY, supra note 27, at 27; K. DAM, supra note 100, at 24.
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stated as follows: "First, the need to encourage the most rapid and
thorough exploration and economical exploration of petroleum re-
sources on the Continental Shelf. Second, the requirement that the ap-
plicant for a license shall be incorporated in the United Kingdom and
the profits of the operation shall be taxable here. Thirdly, in cases
where the applicant is a foreign-owned concern, how far British oil
companies receive equitable treatment in that country. Fourthly, we
shall look at the programme of work of the applicant and also at the
ability and resources to implement it. Fifthly, we shall look at the con-
tribution the applicant has already made and is making towards the
development of resources for our Continental Shelf and the develop-
ment of our fuel economy generally."' 57 The British knew that the first
criterion would, by necessity, require an active foreign participation if
rapid exploration was to be possible. Krapels speculated that the Brit-
ish oil companies "probably were given all they could handle." '
Thus, the third and fifth criteria were especially included to give British
companies favorable treatment in the selection of blocks. The goal was
apparently reached, as MacKay and Mackay reported that the British
firms "appear to have obtained a relatively higher proportion of the
more promising areas." The fifth criterion made it easy to justify giv-
ing one of the British firms a choice region. British Petroleum is re-
ported to have been especially fortunate in this regard.' 9
Recognizing the importance of foreign participation in achieving
the goal of rapid development, the Ministry was very concerned about
making the terms equitable to all. At the time, international oil licenses
typically attempted an even division of profits between the host govern-
ment and the licensee. Thus, production licenses in the first round re-
quired a royalty payment of twelve and one-half percent, in addition to
the standard corporate tax rate that would apply to North Sea earnings.
The government expected this fifty percent range to be comparable to
that taken in the Netherlands and the United States, although it repre-
sented less than the amounts taken in Norway, Nigeria, and the Middle
East.160 However, the government's efforts at fairness have since been
labeled a "give-away."' 61 The problem, as reported by the Public Ac-
157. D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, snpra note 27, at 24 (quoting Minister of Power Hansard,
692 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th Ser.) 897 (1964)).
158. E. KRAPEis, supra note 109, at 10.
159. North Sea Gas: At the First Try, 216 ECONOMIST 1237 (1965).
160. See D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, supra note 27, at 31.
161. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 44; see also A. SAMPsoN, supra note 32, at 180 ("The
first huge areas of the sea, of a hundred square miles each, were leased to the companies as gener-
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counts Committee of the House of Commons, was that the Exchequer
would receive a far smaller share of oil revenues than expected because
of the law permitting companies to offset income at home with losses
incurred overseas. 62 The provision was originally enacted because of
the vast operations of British oil companies in the Middle East, which
were subject to large Arab taxation. Subsequent changes in the tax
laws, applying specifically to off-shore petroleum production income,
and stiffer licensing terms in later rounds did attempt to retain a larger
share of the profits for Britain.
2. The Second Licensing Round-1965
The second licensing round was conducted by the new Labour
Government in August 1965 and was somewhat smaller than the round
held one year before.163 Most of the blocks offered were along a narrow
strip between the previously licensed areas outside the North Sea and
some blocks that were offered the previous year. 64 Although 1,102
blocks were offered, the interest shown by the private companies was
not good. Only about eleven percent of the offered blocks were applied
for, resulting in thirty-seven production licenses being granted. 6 The
area licensed in the second round was only about one-third as much as
that in the first round.
Despite the change in governments, the method of allocation and
financial terms for second round licenses were essentially the same as
in the first. The discretionary system was again used, but this time the
decisions were made by a new Minister of Power. There was a signifi-
cant change, however, in the presentation of the applicant's proposed
work program. No longer would applicants include the work program
as part of their application, but now were granted conditional approval
of a license, if they satisfied the basic criteria, subject to later submis-
sion, and Ministry approval, of a program. 166
Certainly, one of the reasons that the Labour Government did not
attempt to make the licensing terms any less favorable to private com-
panies was due to the increased activity in the North Sea by other gov-
ously as though Britain were a gullible sheikdom, with concessions running for forty-six years.
And the British government would gain almost nothing in taxes . .
162. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 14-15.
163. See D. MAcKAY & G. MACKAY, supra note 27, at 24 (Table 2.3).
164. K. DAM, supra note 100, at 29.
165. See E. KRAPELs, supra note 109, at 13.
166. See K. DAM, supra note 100, at 29.
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emments. At this time, both Norway and the Dutch were introducing
licensing and the feeling was that companies would begin shopping for
the most favorable deal.'67 A report by the Norwegian Petroleum
Committee reflects this attitude.
In the North Sea area it is particularly natural and simple
for the international oil companies to make comparisons be-
tween the compensation systems of the various North Sea
States. At present one must count on the possibility of
reserves being found in all the North Sea States' continental
shelves. The compensation system may thus cause the com-
panies to concentrate their exploration in the areas where the
financial considerations are most favourable. 68
It would not be until later rounds, when most of the reserves in the
British shelf were assumed to have been found, that British govern-
ments would feel less pressure to attract oil companies.
The criteria that the Labour Party Minister required in judging
applications was essentially the same as in the first round, except for
one significant addition providing for state participation. Taken into
account were any proposals made "for facilitating participation by
public enterprise in the development and exploitation of resources of
the continental shelf."169 Increasing British participation was very im-
portant to the Labour Government, for, like the Conservatives in the
first round, they recognized that a goal of rapid exploration and devel-
opment would by necessity require much foreign involvement, due to
the advanced state of the American industry. In the first round, while
British participation stood at thirty percent of the total, state participa-
tion was only three percent. In the second round, the government fa-
vored applicants who were willing to include the British Gas Council
or the National Coal Board, and state participation was able to increase
to about ten percent, while total British participation rose to forty-one
percent. 170 According to Dam, the preference for state participation
affected the licenses in two ways.
First, the Gas Council, which in the first round had had a
31 percent share in a group made up of Amoco (Standard of
Indiana), Amerada, and Texas Eastern interests, increased its
participation in that group to a 50 percent share of the sec-
167. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 355.
168. See Daintith & Gault, supra note 68, at 56 (citing Odelsting Proposition No. 47 (1964-65),
Recommendation No. 3).
169. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 355 (citing 716 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th Ser.) 1579 (1965)).
170. See K. DAm, supra note 100, at 38.
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ond-round licenses. Second, the National Coal Board was
brought into the oil and gas business insofar as Gulf and Al-
lied Chemical gave the board "options to participate in any
licenses granted to them, subject to the necessary powers be-
ing conferred on the Board by Parliament."' 17 1
The holdings of the National Coal Board would in later years become
the assets of BNOC.
3. The Third Round of Licensing-1969
The third round, conducted by the Labour Government in late
1969, does not stand out as one of the more significant. The govern-
ment offered 157 blocks and received thirty-four applications covering
117 of those blocks. 172 In all, thirty-seven production licenses were
granted covering about 8,000 square miles of U.K. shelf.t73
Once again, the Labour Government instituted a policy review of
the licensing system and terms before conducting the new round. 74
And once again it determined that the discretionary method of alloca-
tion and the surrender and financial terms of the production license
had no good cause for being changed.175 The review considered adopt-
ing the auction system but rejected the idea, noting that the prospect of
major finds to attract oil firms was too uncertain, and that Britain
needed to retain its interest in smaller, higher-cost gas fields. 176
The announced criteria for the third round remained similar to
that required in 1965,177 but Minister of Power Mason stated that there
would be "some added preference for groups involving the Gas Coun-
cil and the NCB [National Coal Board] and other British interests."' 178
171. Id at 29 (quoting Minister of Power, 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th Sr.) 518 (1965)).
172. See E. KRAI.Ls, supra note 109, at 13.
173. See D. MAcKAY & G. MACKAY, T.p/ra note 27, at 27. Thirty-two thousand square miles
were licensed in round one, while 10,000 and 24,000 were licensed in round two and round four,
respectively. Id Although round three involved the smallest licensed area of the first four
rounds, private company response was regarded as good, especially considering that only 11% of
land offered in the prior round was applied for.
174. See K. DAM, supra note 100, at 29.
175. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 12.
176. See K DAM, supra note 100, at 30.
177. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 355-56.
The applicant's program of work and ability to carry it out. The applicant's previous
exploration work relevant to the areas applied for. The applicant's facilities for disposal
in the U.K. of any oil or gas produced. For foreign-owned applicants, the extent to
which British-owned companies receive equitable treatment in that country. The extent
to which the application provided for participation by Public Enterprise in the develop-
ment and exploitation of the resources of the Continental Shelf.
Id
178. See E. KERA'Ls, supra note 109, at 12.
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The Ministry devised a plan that was destined to ensure the govern-
ment's involvement in oil with BNOC. The advantage for the state
participants was that their choices did not have to be made until the
consortium in fact proved to be successful. This differed from the sec-
ond round system where the state agencies were made part of consor-
tium at the time of licensing, and thus faced the same risks that the
private companies faced as to whether the assigned area would prove
successful. The British Gas Council was also given several blocks to
operate on its own in the Irish Sea. 79 By increasing Gas Council par-
ticipation, the government intended to enhance its own knowledge in
negotiating with private companies and to further its understanding of
purchasing gas and incurring costs.18 0 In many ways, taking an active
role in the North Sea was not a natural function for the Gas Council
and National Coal Board. However, the Labour Party, unsuccessful in
satisfying some party members' efforts to create a national hydrocar-
bons corporation, apparently saw these two agencies as a suitable
method of achieving the desired North Sea participation level.' 8 '
4. The Fourth Round of Licensing-1971-72
The fourth round joins the first as the most significant of all
rounds held to date. The fourth was one of the largest held, was the
first to open up the northern basin, and served as Britain's only experi-
ment with the auction system of license allocation.
When the Conservatives returned to power, they were determined
to reverse the trend of increasing state participation in offshore drilling
and to provide more territory for development," 2 learning from the
third round that the territory offered should be sufficient to meet the
demand.1 83 Recent discoveries of oil by Amoco at Montrose and Brit-
ish Petroleum at the Forties Field indicated that the potential for oil
would make the northern basin attractive to applicants. When the
fourth round began in 1972, the government offered 435 blocks, of
which 286 were applied for.'" The large round concluded with 118
production licenses being granted, covering an area of 24,000 square
179. See Woodliffe, supra note 17, at 253. The BGC was represented by a subsidiary set up
for this purpose. Id
180. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 12-13.
181. See K. Dtm, supra note 100, at 31.
182. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 13.
183. See id at 7.
184. D. MAcKAY & G. MACKAY, supra note 27, at 27 (Table 2.3).
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miles. 185
'Most of the licenses were allocated under the discretionary system.
The Conservatives stayed with the familiar system because of the im-
portance of the territory being offered, the need to develop marginal
fields, and because most in the government believed that the system
had served Britain well. However, due to the persistence of some party
members, it was decided that fifteen blocks would be offered on an
experimental basis under a competitive bidding system similar to that
used in the United States.'86 Although certain minimum critoria would
be required, it was still anticipated that many of the choice blocks
would bring high bidding prices.' 87 Of the fifteen blocks offered, some
were considered very attractive while others were deemed marginal. 188
,"For auction-system proponents, the results were very encouraging. For
the fifteen blocks, the government received thirty-seven million
pounds, an amount easily surpassing the three million pounds received
from total fees assessed on the 271 blocks offered in the fourth round
under the discretionary system.'" 9 Many agree that the results show
that continued use of the discretionary system in the round was a mis-
take. MacKay and Mackay concluded that "the [government] took a
conservative, even a pessimistic view of the future, while the oil compa-
nies were evidently more optimistic. Subsequent events have proved
the assessment of the oil companies to have been correct."' 190 The Pub-
lic Accounts Committee of the House of Commons went even further,
calling the use of the discretionary system in that round "a major com-
mercial misjudgment."' 9 ' Further, MacKay and Mackay argue that
the government was in effect paying far too much in foregone tender
premiums, the bid-amount offered under the auction system, for the
amount of control it received.' 92 By insisting upon a good system of
minimum work program criteria for all bidders, the govcould
gm-b----b61ho-- tn- -an- large financial recovery. 93 The government's
185. Id
186. E. K .AI'-Ls, supra note 109, at 14.
187. Id
188. Id
189. D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, supra note 27, at 29. Some argue that these results would
not be indicative of the true outcome because too many choice blocks were included in the com-
petitive offering.
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id at 29-30.
193. The government did in fact reserve the right to reject any tender bids, including the
highest, if the offeror was considered inadequate. Id
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response was to-cite changing economic-conditions as reasons to con-
tinue to court the private oil companies.194 Despite the governmental
control involved in the discretionary system, private industry fre-
quently supports discretionary systems they believe to be fair. Un-
doubtedly, the real reason private industry approved of such a system is
that the inexpensive licensing fees assessed are far preferable to the ex-
pensre bids occurring m the competitive system. 195
5. The Fifth Round of Licensing-1976
In the fall of 1976, the government conducted the fifth round of
licensing, offering only seventy-one blocks or part-blocks, but imple-
menting new terms providing for participation by the newly-formed
state oil company, BNOC. 1 96 The relatively small number of block of-
ferings reflected a new governmental strategy of offering less territory
each round, but holding rounds more frequently.197 In March of 1977,
the Department of Energy conditionally granted production licenses to
sixty-five companies, covering forty-four of the blocks or part-blocks
offered.198 Despite the tougher terms required by the Labour Govern-
ment, much of the success of the round is attributable to the reputation
of the blocks offered as having "good hydrocarbon prospects in known
sedimentary basins."199
Once again, the discretionary allocation __ystem was used for
awarding licenses, but this time the rationale for its use was that it of-
fered the only reasonable way to require oil companies toagreeto state
participation. The most important criteria for the fifth round included
the second and fifth conditions listed in the fourth round, above, and
made it mandatory that licensees provide for a fifty-one percent partici-
pation option for BNOC. 2° Before a license was officially granted, the
applicant had to provide a satisfactory work program for the Depart-
ment of Energy and to reach terms with BNOC on a form of operating
194. See id at 28. Examples include raising the dry hole ratio and increasing OPEC-posted
prices. Id
195. Champagne, supra note 150. Sometimes the highest bidder will triple the amount offered
by the second highest, leaving millions of dollars "on the table." Id
196. New "ffshore blocks on offer, 43 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 343, 343-44 (1976).
197. Id
198. UnitedKingdom New OffshoreAwards, 44 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST" 107, 108 (1977) (list
of blocks granted and companies receiving them).
199. New offshore blocks on offer, supra note 196,-at 343.
200. D. KETO, supra note 22, at 87. The fourth round criteria are discussed at supra notes 177-
78 and accompanying text.
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agreement.2"' BNOC (or British Gas Corporation, where applicable)
planned to participate on a "carried interest" basis similar to a program
which had been working successfully in Norway. BNOC was given the
option of deciding whether to take its fifty percent participation, but it
would have to pay its share of future and past development costs, in-
cluding exploration appraisal work and costs. 20 2
One reason that the terms were stiffer under the fifth round is that
new Petroleum (Production) Regulations were passed in 1976.203 New
license surrender terms were more onerous than those of previous
rounds, while financially, the fifth round was the most expensive to
date for the oil companies. The 1976 Regulations required that a licen-
see surrender one-third of its licensed area to the government after only
four years, with another one-third being relinquished three years
later.2°4 The forty-year term for the remaining portion was reduced to
thirty years.205 The oil companies were able to convince the Depart-
ment of Energy to eliminate the four-year rule, requiring instead that a
full two-thirds be returned at the end of year seven.20 6
Financially, the government increased its intake by instituting a
new way to calculate the twelve and one-half percent royalty,20 7 and by
increasing fees and annual rentals.208
One of the attributes of the discretionary allocation system. from
the government's point of view, is that-it is effective at keeping control
over licensees. In the fifth round, Amoco was reminded of this power
when the "old faithful" in British offshore exploration was purposely
excluded from the new list of licensees because of Amoco's obstinance
in being the only operator to refuse to renegotiate previous licensing
terms to include BNOC participation. 20 9 Although Amoco subse-
quently consented, it was too late for it to be included among the fifth
round recipients.
By mid-1977, the first seven fields discovered had gone into pro-
duction, providing about one-half of Britain's needs.210 Over fifty dis-
201. UKsJffth round, 43 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 258, 258 (1976).
202. Daintith & Gault, supra note 68, at 59.
203. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Regulations are frequently changed.
204. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976, sched. 5, cls. 3(1) & 3(2).
205. Id
206. See New offshore blocks on offer, supra note 196, at 342-43.
207. The 12.5% royalty was calculated on a tax value basis rather than on the lower wellhead
price.
208. See UK'sfrjh round, supra note 201, at 258.
209. See G. ARNOLD, su.pra note 10, at 147.
210. Id at 144.
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coveries and fourteen fields had been proved commercial and were
under development.21" ' British politicians anticipated that in 1979
enough oil would be coming from the British shelf to entirely satisfy
Britain's needs.2"2
6. The Sixth Round of Licensing-1978
The British government continued its strategy of offering small
rounds on a more frequent basis. Renewing an avowed intent to
"rrengthen British control over our offshore resources," Secretary of
State for Energy Benn announced that the sixth round would be con-
ducted in the summer of 1978.213 The round proved satisfactory, de-
spite stiffer terms concerning state participation and the small size of
the offering. Of the forty-six blocks offered, forty-two were condition-
ally granted to sixty-five companies.2"4 All blocks were applied for, but
four were denied allocation, because of applicant's demands that
sought-after areas be included along with the unattractive blocks.215
There was concern over the sixth round's likelihood of success be-
cause of stringent new requirements that successful applicants be pre-
pared to offer BNOC more than the fifty-one percent participation that
was a condition of the last round.216 On any licenses on which BNOC
exercised its option to participate, companies would not be expected to
stop the practice of assessing BNOC for past exploration and appraisal
costs.2 1 7 In addition, some companies would be expected to offer
BNOC the right to purchase part of their equity share of oil and natu-
ral gas.218 Despite the relative success of the round, it has been consid-
ered significant that Exxon, the industry giant, chose to sit out the sixth
round. Exxon insinuated that the government's conditions greatly in-
fluenced the decision. Geological prospects for the blocks offered were
not attractive "in view of the economic and investment
environment." 219
211. Id at 54.
212. Id
213. UK North Sewv Increased Particioation in Sixth Round, 45 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 261,
261-62 (1978) (quoting Secretary Benn).
214. UK North Sex" Results of Sixth Licensing Round, 43 PETROLEuM ECONOMIST 170, 170
(1976).
215. Id
216. See UK North Sex" Increased Particpation in Sixth Round, supra note 213, at 261.
217. Id
218. Id
219. UK North Sex Sixth Round Fully-Subscribed, 45 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 526, 526
(1978).
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Certainly, the sixth round reflected the Labour Party's view that
companies operating in the British shelf would increasingly be expected
to show a spirit of partnership in "obtaining the fullest possible benefits
for Britain. 220
7. The Seventh Round of Licensing-1980-81
The seventh round began in 1980 and continued into 1981. With
the Conservatives back in power, ninety blocks were made available,
making this the largest offering since the fourth round.22' Interest was
especially strong during this round, partially because of the govern-
ment's adoption of the suggestion by the U.K. Offshore Operator's As-
sociation that oil companies be given the option of selecting their own
blocks for exploration. When the first phase of allocations were an-
nounced in December of 1980, forty-two licenses were awarded by this
auction system, collecting an estimated 210 million pounds for the Ex-
chequer under this "own choice method. '222 The method used by the
Department of Energy defined an area in the eastern part of the British
shelf out of which the oil companies requested specific areas to de-
Velop.223 A Department of Energy spokesman labeled the plan "ex-
tremely successful," as 125 applicants were submitted by 200
companies, the largest number of applicants since the first British off-
shore licensing round.224 Among those companies receiving licenses
were the major multi-nationals, such as British Petroleum and Shell,
and also a number of consortiums with small operators.225 BNOC was
named operator in three of the licenses.226 When the second phase of
licenses were awarded in March of 1981, thirty-seven more licenses
were awarded, bringing the total number of companies to 119.227
Despite the considerably higher fee, 5 million pounds per block,
assessed for "own choice" blocks, the high demand shows that smaller
fields were still attractive. Since it has been estimated that over two-
thirds of the recoverable resources of the British shelf were licensed out
220. See UK North Seax Increased Particeiation in Sixth Round, supra note 213, at 261-62.
221. See UK seventh round larger than expected, supra note 149, at 238.
222. The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1981, at 18, col. 5.
223. The area selected was betweenthe 56th and 62d parallels. Id
224. Another reason for the success is the attractiveness of some of the blocks offered, as a new
region was opened northwest of the Shetland Islands. Id
225. Id
226. Id
227. The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1981, at 21, col. 4.
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in the first four rounds,22 8 much of Britain's future in developing the
shelf will depend on companies being willing to try for the more lim-
ited venture. Among the apparent factors contributing to the demand
in the seventh round were the rising prices for oil and gas and the prox-
imity of the offered blocks to the government's planned gas-gathering
pipeline.2 29 There had been concern that the Conservative Govern-
ment's new petroleum taxes-a twenty percent Supplementary Petro-
leum Duty based on gross revenues, in addition to the Petroleum
Revenue Tax-would make many smaller to medium-sized fields eco-
nomically infeasible.230 However, Minister of Energy Gray declared
the round a success and minimized the importance of the tax changes.
Gray said, "[Companies are used to working in hostile waters with
hostile tax regimes. Despite the changes the North Sea remains one of
the most attractive and encouraging environments in the World."" 1
8. The Eighth Round of Licensing-1982-83
The Conservative Government opened the eighth licensing round
in September of 1982 and offered 184 blocks, nearly three-quarters of
which were in previously unexplored areas .1 2 While some of-the terri-
tory being offered was in deepwater blocks in the far north and off
southwest Wales, the oil companies expressed the most interest in the
large tracts found near producing fields in the north and central North
Sea.3 3 Stiff competition was expected for those areas which were once
again being offered on an auction basis. However, only fifteen of the
eighty-five blocks expected to be licensed at the conclusion of the round
in the spring of 1983 were scheduled to be awarded on the auction
basis.234
The blocks being offered in the more speculative, new exploration
areas were expected to serve as a good indication of. the effect of the
Conservative Government's changes in its tax regime. In March of
1982, the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced proposals to take ef-
fect in January 1983, which included abolishing the Supplementary Pe-
troleum Duty which was in effect during the seventh round, raising the
228. Evans, supra note 2. Two-thirds of the total resources are believed to have been licensed
in the first four rounds. Id
229. UK North Sex Depletion Control by Delay, 47 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 400, 400 (1980).
230. The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1981, at 18, col. 5.
231. Id
232. UK opens eighth round, 49 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 413, 413 (1982).
233. Id
234. Id
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rate of the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) from seventy to seventy-five
percent, and introducing a system for advance payments of the PRT.235
Although the overall effect of the new tax regime is to narrowly reduce
the marginal rate of tax and slightly improve the profitability of exist-
ing fields, it was still criticized for not offering relief for the small fields
which were increasingly being declared economically infeasible by the
oil companies. 36 The problem in developing smaller fields was caused
by the combination of falling oil prices, inflation, and the high taxes.
Indeed, none of the twelve discoveries made during 1981 were certain
of being commercially feasible. This led some critics to charge that the
government's new tax regime would cause a drop in Britain's oil pro-
duction in the late 1980's and early 1990's.237
VI. STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE BRITISH SECTOR
For years, the British have been willing to provide for government
involvement in private industry where national economic interests were
perceived as being at stake. The government has frequently taken steps
to place controls on the private sector to influence its behavior and en-
joy a greater share of the financial returns.238 In North Sea offshore
development activity, the government has been defining and redefining
its role ever since it first established jurisdiction over the seabed
resources.3 9
Control over the offshore oil industry in the United Kingdom has
been attempted in three ways.2' ° First, a review of the previous section
of this Article shows an active and on-going regulation of offshore ex-
ploration and development, through the discretionary licensing system.
Secondly, oil companies are subject to various forms of taxation: a cor-
porate tax on earnings, a petroleum revenue tax, and a twelve and one-
half percent royalty.?" Thirdly, the government has provided partici-
pation rights in offshore activities to its energy-related public corpora-
235. Kemp & Rose, North Sea economics revised, 49 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 133, 133 (1982).
236. Id A British Petroleum spokesman claimed that fields with reserves of less than 80 mil-
lion barrels would no longer be feasible under this tax regime. Id
237. Davis, Why the North Sea bubble burst, The Times (London), Apr. 30, 1982, at 17, col. 2.
238. Nationalized coal and airline industries are examples.
239. Some would argue that it is more accurate to say that the government tries to be able to
forecast the private sector's next move.
240. Cranston & Puri, Government as Entrepreneur and Planner Aspects of Recent Industrial
Strategy in Britain, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L. 78, 94 (1979).
241. Oil Taxation Act, 1975, ch. 22.
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tions-the British Gas Council (BGC), the National Coal Board
(NCB), and the BNOC.
The next section of this Article examines the involvement and ef-
fect BNOC has on the North Sea oil environment. Since its inception
in 1976, BNOC has established an increasingly formidable presence in
carrying out its own functions and the policies of the British govern-
ment.242 It is an actor in the British oil scene with which American oil
companies may have to deal and certainly should understand.
Since as early as 1965, during the second licensing round, increas-
ing state participation in offshore activities has been a goal of British
governments.243 Even in the first round, when the purpose was at-
tracting private oil companies to begin immediate development, the
BGC still received three percent of the licensed area.2' Within a year,
the NCB was given specific authorization to join in offshore oil activity
and soon after, in the second round, state participation doubled.24 As
subsequent rounds progressed, participation has reached the point to-
day where BNOC, successor to the interests of the NCB and the BGC,
through its exploration subsidiary, is now an active competitor with
private companies operating in the British continental shelf. The state
participants function both as individual recipients of licenses and, more
frequently, as members of an operating consortium.
A. The Public Corporation and Offshore Drilling
State participation in British oil and gas has been accomplished
through a vehicle known as the public corporation. The BGC, NCB
and BNOC are all, in various forms, public corporations.2' The public
corporation in Britain is by no means unique to the oil industry. One
242. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 161, quoting Lord Kearton, former chairman of
BNOC.
What we have done is come through a year when the betting of the oil companies was
that we wouldn't survive that year. It seems to me that the next six months will see
BNOC become an increasing influence, and by the 1980s it will be a very powerful influ-
ence on the European oil scene.
Id
243. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 11.
244. Id Three percent was considered very small for a nationalized monopolistic industry.
At the time, the National Coal Board was not authorized to participate in the offshore program.
Id
245. Authorization was received under the National Coal Board (Additional Powers) Act,
1966, ch. 47, § 1(1). Participation increased to 6%. E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 11.
246. See generally G. Arnold, supra note 10, at 113 (contains the beginning of an extensive
discussion of the role of the BGC in the British gas industry). Neither the BGC nor the National
Coal Board is discussed in depth in this Article.
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commentator has written: "Public corporations as an institution are of
quite respectable antiquity. Certain public bodies with specific func-
tions are well known in England in the nineteenth century. '247 The
three state energy companies discussed herein are what Professor Rob-
son has called "new public corporations concerned with the operation
of great socialized industries or services."2 48 Examples of the so-called
"new public corporation" in Britain include the original, the Port of
London Authority, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, the
London Passenger Transport Board, and the British Overseas Airways
Corporation (now British Airways)." 9
There is not a precise definition of the British public corpora-
tion. 50 Rather, Friedmann says there is only a general concept that
has emerged from a "number of specialized public bodies. . . created
for specific purposes."25 I He argues that the most accurate way to con-
sider the public corporation is not as "a multi-purpose authority but a
functional organization, created for a specific purpose." 2
B. Formation of BNOC
The BNOC operates from a unique position in the British oil in-
dustry. In a paper presented by one of BNOC's managing directors,
J.D.A. Evans, its function is described.
First, B.N.O.C. is not-and never has been-a regulatory
or supervisory agency, as are quite a number of national oil
companies. B.N.O.C. is not simply an extension of a Govern-
ment Department and its employees are not Civil Servants.
B.N.O.C. is not there to raise revenues from the private sec-
tors for the Exchequer-that is done through the tax system.
B.N.O.C. is a public (i.e., Government-owned) Corporation
in the business of petroleum exploration and production,
alongside the private sector of the industry.5 3
One element which makes BNOC unique from many public corpora-
247. Friedmann, The Public Corporation in Great Britain, in THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 162
(W. Friedmann ed. 1954). Friedmann cites these as the Public Trustee, the Prison Commissioners,
the Public Record Office, or the Board of Control (for mental diseases). Id
248. Id Robson says that these are a result of "the need for a high degree of freedom, bold-
ness, and enterprise in the management of undertakings of an industrial or commercial character
and the desire to escape from the caution and circumspection which is considered typical of gov-
ernment departments." Id
249. Id
250. Id at 163.
251. Id
252. Id
253. Evans, supra note 2.
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tions, and certainly the BGC with its monopoly position,254 is BNOC's
direct relationship with the private sector. In every sense, the British
government looks upon BNOC as its only true representative possess-
ing any clout in an industry controlled by multi-nationals.25 5 Lord
Kearton, BNOC's first chairman, said at the time of its formation in
1976: "This is a policy geared to the real world."256
Friedmann in 1954, twenty-one years before BNOC was formed,
compiled a list of what he called "certain universal legal characteristics
of the [British] public corporation, applicable to all types. '257  These
characteristics are still very useful for illustrating BNOC's characteris-
tics, and are presented and discussed here.
1. The public corporation is normally created by special
statute or (exceptionally) by charter. It does not, like a
commercial company, come into existence automatically,
on fulfillment of certain conditions." s
The BNOC is a statutory creation. Part I, Section I, of the Petro-
leum and Submarine Pipelines Act of 1975 established a body corpo-
rate called the British National Oil Corporation." 9 Section 2(1) defines
BNOC's general powers and includes a broad function provision:
"(a) to search for and get petroleum existing in its natural condition
in strata in any part of the world." The BNOC's right to participate
with private oil companies in offshore activities, as given by the govern-
ment through licensing provisions, is authorized in section 2(l)(e).26°
Section 2(l)(f) provides for BNOC to gather and disseminate petro-
leum information to any person-which most certainly includes its pri-
mary benefactor, the Department of Energy.26 1 BNOC's information
function becomes relevant to oil companies and operating consortia
that must provide information about their operations to BNOC. Ini-
254. See Cranston & PurL, supra note 240, at 95. Monopoly is granted in supplying gas.
255. Cf. FoRBEs, Aug. 1, 1976, at 50 (British Petroleum, although 48% government-owned, has
interests all over the world and is truly an international oil company. This independence led
many politicians to consider it unsuitable to be further connected with the government.).
256. Id
257. See Friedmann, supra note 247, at 164. Seven of Friedmam's "characteristics" are used
in the following pages to illustrate the nature of BNOC.
258. Id
259. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74.
260. (e). . .to do anything required for the purposes of giving effect to agreements en-
tered into by the Secretary of State [for Energy] with a view to securing participation by
the Government of the United Kingdom, or by the Corporation or any other body on
behalf of the Government, in activities connected with petroleum beneath controlled
waters.
Id § 2(l)(e).
261. Id § 2()(f).
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tially, BNOC was not given authority to receive production licenses
from the Department of Energy; however, subsequent amendments to
the Petroleum (Production) Regulations changed that.262 The BNOC
is also permitted to provide and operate pipelines, tanker-ships, and
refineries, and to carry out research in connection with petroleum.263
2. The public corporation has no shares and no sharehold-
ers, either private or public. Its shareholder, in a sym-
bolic sense, is the nation represented through
Government and Parliament.26
The BNOC is fully government-owned. It has no shareholder's
equity in the traditional sense of stock being held by either the private
sector or the government. Rather, BNOC was given an initial debt to
cover operations of 600 million pounds, subject to the power of the
Secretary of State for Energy to increase the amount to 900 pounds. 265
Clearly, at the time of formation, the Labour Government considered
BNOC as the nation's oil company: "Perhaps most important of al, we
shall gain for this country an independent capability in oil and gas pro-
duction which will reduce our dependence upon international and
other oil companies. 2 66
3. The responsibility of the public corporation is to the Gov-
ernment, represented by the competent Minister, and
through the Minister to parliament.267
The BNOC operates subject to the approval of the Secretary of
State for Energy. Section 3 of the Act defines the Corporation's general
duties which, in each subsection, are either to be performed for the
Secretary of State, actually the Department of Energy, or, if for the
Corporation itself, with the Secretary's consent.268 Section 4 specifi-
cally establishes the Secretary of State's authority over BNOC and his
power to give it directions.269 Throughout the 1975 Act are require-
ments that BNOC keep the Secretary fully informed of its activities.270
Krapels believes that such provisions indicate that, under the 1975 Act,
262. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 26.
263. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 2(2).
264. Friedmann, supra note 247, at 164.
265. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 25.
266. Id at 19 (citing statement by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy John
Smith, in the House of Commons in April 1975).
267. Friedmann, supra note 247, at 164.
268. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 3(3).
269. Id § 4. "(l)The Secretary of State may, after consultation with the Corporation, give to
the Corporation such general or specific directions as the Secretary of State thinks fit." Id
270. See E. KRAPEs, supra note 109, at 24.
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BNOC actually has less autonomy than most public corporations in
Britain.271 He cites as an example of such restrictions section 2(4),
which details activities that BNOC shall not engage in without receiv-
ing permission of the Secretary, such as refining and exploration
outside Great Britain.272
Additionally, BNOC is the only national industry that cannot re-
tain its own profits; they are paid into the National Oil Account.273
Whatever the importance of the extent of the Department of Energy's
involvement, there is little room to question that BNOC is in fact re-
sponsible to the government, first and foremost. It is interesting, how-
ever, that section 1(5) declares that the Corporation is not to be
regarded as a "servant or as an agent of the Crown. . . and its prop-
erty is not to be regarded as property of or held on behalf of the
Crown." This section, however, addresses legal implications of BNOC
and should not be interpreted as declaring that it is in practice separate
of the government. Other examples of BNOC's close relationship with
the government include its advisory capacity to the government and its
agency role in performing specified functions on the Department of En-
ergy's behalf.274 However, since the Conservatives returned to power
in 1979, there has been an effort to curtail some of BNOC's close ties
with the Energy Department. BNOC was relieved of its advisory role,
although not by statute, and its privilege of sitting in on operating com-
mittees of fields in which it was not participating. 27
4. The administration of the public corporation is entirely in
the hands of a Board which is appointed by the compe-
tent Minister, sometimes after and mostly without consul-
271. Id The Secretary of State for Energy during House of Commons debate over the BNOC
declared that it would "have a specially close and intimate contact with the Government." Id
But see Evans, supra note 2. Legislation has been proposed that would reduce BNOC's role as
advisor to the Department of Energy.
272. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 2(4).
273. Id §40.
274. Id ch. 1, §§ 2(1)d, 3(3) & 3(5). Financing is particularly closely controlled. See Wood-
liffe, supra note 17, at 264.
The strength of the financial control exercised by the government derives first, from the
duties imposed upon B.N.O.C. to settle with the Secretary of State and keep under re-
view, both its immediate and longer-term corporate plans and its annual investment
programmes and budgets. The advantage claimed for this form of review is that since all
monies going into and out of N.O.A. are directly managed by the government, the latter
will thereby at all times be informed of the corporation's plans, and can exercise its
supervision more effectively in respect of all but "trivial day to day matters."
Id
275. Forster & Zillman, The British National Oil Corporation, 3 J. ENERGY L. & PoL'Vy 57, 80
(1982).
1983]
42
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JO UAL
tation of special interests. Neither the Board members
nor any employees of a Board are civil servants.276
The Secretary of State is given authority in section 1(2) to appoint
the Members of the Corporation "from among persons appearing to
him to have had wide experience of, and shown capacity in, activities
connected with petroleum, other industrial, commercial or financial
matters, administration or the organization of workers." 277 There are
indications that section 1(2) is similar to appointment provisions usu-
ally found in constitutions of public corporations.278 However the pro-
vision of section l(3)(c) requiring that the Secretary of State appoint
two members of the civil service to the Members of the Corporation is
not typical under Friedmann's list and is unique to BNOC, among all
British statutory public corporations. 279 This is one area where the
British apparently followed the lead of other national oil companies
and opted for using BNOC as a source of information for the Depart-
ment of Energy.2 80 Charges by opponents of the provision that it cre-
ates a conflict of interest for the Department of Energy officials, who
may have access to confidential information about the private sector
from the department and yet have to advise BNOC on how to compete,
were outweighed by the importance placed on oil for the national
interest.281
5. Where a public corporation needs capital ... it is pro-
vided in the case of public corporations managing nation-
alized industries, through assets taken over from private
ownership and capitalized through the issue of interest-
bearing stock. Such stock is either Government stock or,
in most cases, stock issued by the public corporation with
a Treasury guarantee. . . . The industrial public corpo-
rations have furthermore the power to borrow money,
with the consent of their supervising Minister and the
Treasury, within limits fixed by the Acts.28 2
The financial structure of BNOC differs considerably from that
found in most public corporations. The unique importance that BNOC
has in Britain's energy future and the vast amount of finances expected
276. Friedmann, supra note 247, at 164.
277. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 75, § 1(2). Presently, there are 14
members of the corporation.
278. Woodliffe, supra note 17, at 262.
279. Id at 263.
280. Id
281. Id
282. Friedmann, supra note 247, at 164-65.
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to come its way caused the government to impose more controls on it
than are usually necessary for a public corporation.283
The three fundamental differences between BNOC and the model
described above by Friedmann are that BNOC was not created by na-
tionalization of private industry, it was not initially financed by issu-
ance of stock, and it is the only public corporation that cannot retain its
own profits.
Many national oil companies are the direct result of government
nationalization of the private industry.28 4 The new corporation's assets
are the sequestered properties of the private companies operating
within its borders.2 5 However, plans for BNOC were different. "The
Government does not see a case for total nationalization of the oil in-
dustry," said one high Labour Government official.286 Thus, BNOC
and its fifty-one percent participation was well-suited for state
participation.
BNOC's initial assets were the interests held by the subsidiary of
the NCB in the North Sea, which the Corporation acquired at a cost of
about one hundred million dollars.287 The transfer of these state-
owned assets was especially significant because BNOC then had an im-
mediate stake in production from the Viking gas field and equity inter-
ests in six oil fields. 2 8 Additionally, in that first year of existence, 1976,
BNOC acquired, at the government's request, the U.K. shelf interests
of Burmah Oil Company.2 9 This transaction gave BNOC shares in two
more oil fields and, for the first time, operating responsibility for a field
under development.290
As previously mentioned, BNOC was not issued stock but received
an initial debt of six hundred million pounds with which it was to con-
duct operations.291 Additional money could be borrowed from a spe-
283. Woodliffe, supra note 17, at 262.
284. Evans, supra note 2.
285. Id
286. See G. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 155 (quoting Dr. Jessee Dickson Mabon, Minister of
State, 1976).
287. Evans, supra note 2; see also Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, § 13 (pro-
viding for transfer of these assets at a "sum equal to the face value of those shares").
288. Quinlan, BNOC's threeyears ofprogress, 46 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 19 (1979). The six
oil fields are Thistle, Dunlin, Brae, Hutton, and the U.K. portions of Stratfjord and Murchison.
Id
289. Id
290. Id The Thistle field was under development. In the same transaction, BNOC acquired
Burmah's North Sea subsidiary which added significantly to the corporation's experienced operat-
ing personnel. Id
291. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 25.
1983]
44
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JOURV1AL
cially created government source, the National Oil Account.292 The
account is under the Secretary of State's control, and receives funds
from the revenues of BNOC and the royalties the Department of En-
ergy receives from the petroleum production licenses. 293 Release of
funds to BNOC is subject to the Secretary of State's approval, which
further enhances the government's control over BNOC operations and
plans.294 However, this source of funds for BNOC ceased when the
new Secretary of Energy, David Howell, came into power with the
Conservatives in 1979.291
BNOC's borrowing of funds was by no means limited to the Na-
tional Oil Account. Indeed, BNOC's credibility as an oil company was
never more enhanced than when it successfully concluded substantial
loan arrangements with leading banks from the United States and the
United Kingdom.296 The June 1977 loan package led the chairman of
BNOC, Lord Kearton, to declare, "Some of the most influential and
forward-looking banks in the world have decided that BNOC is worth
backing. 297 One of the most impressive aspects of the loan arrange-
ment was that BNOC did not have to call on the Treasury as guaran-
tee.2 98 Section 8(1) of the 1975 Act provides for full Treasury
guarantee of "repayment of the principal of and the payment of interest
on any sums which the Corporation borrows from a person other than
the Secretary of State."299
Another significant aspect of BNOC financing was that the Corpo-
ration, under section 9(1) of the 1975 Act, was exempt from paying the
Petroleum Revenue Tax assessed all oil companies operating in the
United Kingdom shelf.3 This privilege ended, however, in 1979, with
292. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 40.
293. The Account will be composed principally of royalty and participation revenue, to-
gether with rents and license fees. Participation revenues here refer to the revenues
accruing from the sale of B.N.O.C.'s share of petroleum. Because B.N.O.C. is exempt
from paying Petroleum Revenue Tax, no taxation as such goes into the account.
Id
294. See Woodliffe, supra note 17, at 264.
295. See Forster & Ziliman, supra note 275, at 81.
296. In June of 1977, BNOC received a loan of $825 million from a group of banks which
included Citibank as manager, six other American banks, and four from England and one from
Scotland. The American banks accounted for $675 million of the total. G. ARNOLD, supra note 9,
at 160.
297. Id
298. Arnold thinks that the loans show that BNOC will not be as dependent on the govern-
meat as the Department of Energy might wish. Id
299. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 8(1). Treasury funds are drawn
from the government's Consolidated Fund. Id § 8(3).
300. Id § 9(1).
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the passage of The Finance Act (No. 2) by the new Conservative ma-
jority in Parliament. 01
6. The public corporation has the legal status of a corporate
body with independent legal personality.30 2
The status of BNOC for purpose of legal liability is not specifically
addressed in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act. However,
this is not uncommon in legislation creating British public corpora-
tions.3 03 Friedmann writes, "The Acts do not state specifically that the
public corporation is to be on the same footing as any private legal
person in respect of legal duties, liabilities, charges, etc."3° There are,
however, typical provisions that are found within Acts creating public
corporations that infer a position or role for the corporation. The
Court must then decide whether the corporation is through this posi-
tion so closely tied to the Crown as to impose a privilege and immunity,
or rather is in fact an entity in itself, liable for its own conduct. 05 As in
all public corporation acts, BNOC is declared a "body corporate."3
°
However, this is not determinative of liability until the corporation's
relationship with the Crown is established. Section 1(5) of the 1975 Act
is the provision that becomes crucial in this regard.
It is hereby declared that the Corporation is not to be
regarded as a servant or (except in pursuance of an express
provision in that behalf made by or under this Act) as an
agent of the Crown or as enjoying any status, privilege or im-
munity of the Crown or (subject to section 9 of this Act) as
exempt from any tax, duty, rate, levy or other charge whatso-
ever, whether general or local, and that its property is not to
be regarded as property of or held on behalf of the Crown;
but nothing in this Act shall be construed as derogating from
any privilege, immunity or exemption of the Crown in rela-
tion to any matter as respects which the Corporation acts as
agent of the Crown by virtue of such an express provision as
aforesaid. 0 7
Section 1(5) separates the activities of BNOC into two positions.
301. Finance (No. 2) Act, 1979, ch. 47, § 22.
302. Friedmann, .spra note 247, at 165.
303. Id at 171.
304. Id
305. Id "[Tihe Crown has until recently enjoyed very considerable privileges and immunities,
and some of them still survive." Id The British Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 made the Crown
generally liable in contract and in tort like every other legal person. Id at 172.
306. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 1(1).
307. Id § 1(5).
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First, it establishes as a rule that BNOC is not a servant or agent of the
Crown and thus infers acceptance of full liability as a "person.130 8 Lia-
bility is further established in section 1(5) by language expressly dis-
claiming all privileges and immunities vested in the Crown. This
conclusion is consistent with the holding in the landmark Tamlin v.
Hannaford decision, where a commercial corporation, the British
Transport Commission, was held not to be able to enjoy the Crown
privilege of immunity from the Rent Restriction Acts.30 9 Despite the
corporation's public functions and purposes, it was not to be regarded
as part of the Crown.310 Language in Tamlin by Lord Denning ex-
plains the legal significance of the corporation's public purpose in a
way that further enhances BNOC's independence from the Crown.
In the eye of the law the corporation is its own master and
is answerable as fully as any other person or corporation. It is
not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of
the Crown. Its servants are not civil servants, and its property
is not Crown property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parlia-
ment as any other subject of the King. It is, of course, a pub-
lic authority and its purposes, no doubt, are public purposes,
but it is not a government department nor do its powers fall
within the province of government."
There are, however, some differences between BNOC and other
public corporations, the most significant of which is the element of gov-
ernment control. The last clause of section 1(5) reserves the right of
BNOC to claim the Crown's privileges and immunities where the en-
abling Act expressly requires the corporation to act as an agent of the
government.
How does one really know whether an activity of BNOC is an act
of independence or agency of the Crown? There are two ways. First,
consider the language of Tamlin which excludes the public corpora-
tion's public purposes and authority as being within the province of the
308. See Friedmann, supra note 247, at 17.1. Friedmann identifies a similar clause to this first
portion of§ 1(5) as inferring that the public corporation is expected to take on full liability. Fried-
mann's typical clause: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to exempt the corporation from
liability for any tax, duty, rate, levy or other charge whatsoever, whether general or local." This
clause makes it clear that the public corporation does not participate in any privileges or immuni-
ties of the Crown.
309. Tamlin v. Hannaford, [1950] 1 K.B. 18; [1949] 2 All E.R. 327 (C.A.).
310. See British Broadcasting Corp. v. Johns (Inspector of Taxes), [1964] 1 All E.R. 923
(CA.).
311. 1 K.B. at 24 (per Denning, LJ.).
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government. 12 Second, and most clear, section 3(5) of the 1975 Act
specifically declares certain activities of BNOC as being undertaken
"on behalf of the Crown." 313 Often, this exception takes place when
the Secretary of State orders BNOC to handle and store petroleum
owned by the government-usually for disposing of royalty oil taken in
kind. 4 Clearly, the general powers of section 2, which give BNOC the
opportunity to function as a fully integrated oil company, are not
within the privileges and immunity exception of the last clause of sec-
tion 1(5).315
7. All public corporations are supervised by independent ac-
counting and auditing as well as some form of public con-
trol. But the type of accounting and public control varies
according to the type of public corporation. 6
Section 10 of the 1975 Act provides for the duties of BNOC con-
cerning the preparation of public accounts and records. The require-
ments reflect the high level of government control placed on the
BNOC.317 Subsections (1), (2), and (3) all expressly give the Secretary
of State and the Treasury authority to request certain financial
reports.3
18
C. BNOC as Part of a Stable Legal Environment
During the period of 1965 to 1975, the United Kingdom's policy
towards the oil companies operating in the North Sea changed from
one of "non-intervention" to a system of active governmental involve-
ment.31 9 The government's increased involvement has occurred in
312. Id
313. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 3(5).
It shall be the duty of the Corporation, if so required by the Secretary of State, to under-
take on behalf of the Crown such activities as the Secretary of State may specify with
respect to-
(a) any pipe-lines and any installations for the storage of petroleum which belong
to or are held on behalf of the Crown;
(b) any petroleum belonging to or held on behalf of the Crown.
Id
314. See Evans, supra note 2.
315. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 2.
316. Friedmann, supra note 247, at 165.
317. Secretary of State's power to demand financial records and details of operations repre-
sents the highest form of control--total information.
318. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 10(l)-(3). Section 10(4) gives
the Secretary of State the power to appoint auditors for BNOC accounts and specifies certain
qualifications for them. Id § 10(4).
319. See Woodliffe, supra note 17, at 249. "Until the discovery of oil in 1969. . .license
holders allowed virtually a free rein to pursue their own producing, refining and marketing poli-
cies." Id
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three areas. First, as was shown in the preceding sections on licensing,
the terms forced upon licensees have become progressively more de-
manding."' Secondly, the tax regime has been modified from the orig-
inal system in 1965 to now include a tax on petroleum revenues, in
addition to the corporate earnings tax originally imposed.32 1 Thirdly,
in an area this section will explore, extensive state participation was
introduced through formation of the BNOC. Due to each of these
changes, the legal environment that the oil companies entered in 1965
is now significantly different. This section of the Article explores the
impact the BNOC has had on the stability of the legal environment of
British offshore oil.
-'-Certainly, among the most important criteria that a company con-
siders in making an investment in a foreign country is the political,
economic, and legal stability that the host country offers. Understanda-
bly, a company is concerned that the rights it has when an investment is
made will in fact continue to be enjoyed in the years following the com-
umtment of the investment. Relative to many of the other oil producing
nations, especially those classified as third world countries, the United
Kingdom and the other North Sea states can be considered politically
and economically stable. While North Sea countries may have polit-
ical debate and rising inflation, they are not countries on the verge of
revolution or creating new economic orders. They are, however, like
most countries, subject to political pressures and changing economic
conditions in the world, which can affect the legal environment of a
particular industry. For companies, undoubtedly the most feared
change in its legal relationship with a country is the nationalization of p
foreign assets. Nationalization in the traditional sense of seizure of
property is not the only concern. While a foreign company may be
permitted to continue ownership, restrictions on the use of the asset or
the disposal of its product can be just as significant.
In Britain, nothing so drastic as nationalization, in the traditional
sense of the meaning, has occurred.3 2 However, there is no question
that the introduction of BNOC, and its option to participate on a fifty-
one percent carried interest basis, represents a change in the legal rela-
tionship between the government and oil companies.323 While partici-
pation was made a condition for all licenses granted beginning in the
320. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
321. Oil Taxation Act, 1975, ch. 22.
322. Evans, supra note 2.
323. "Carried interest" means that BNOC will pay its share, usually 51%, of the costs.
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fifth round, thus still giving companies a choice as to whether they
wanted to invest under such terms, those companies holding licenses
from the first four rounds, when participation was not demanded, were
particularly upset by the government's order that BNOC be negotiated
a participation right in each.3 24 In essence, it could be argued that the
government was ripping up a contract-after the investment was com-
mitted-and ordering new terms.
Was this action unconscionable? Does it indicate a lack of legal
security and a loss of credibility for Britain? Some argue that it does
not. It is the position of Daintith and Gault that an understanding of
British constitutional law would put oil companies on notice that future
actions of Parliament cannot be restricted by contract. 32 Thus, all
licenses or other forms of contract issued by the government are always
subject to change should the government consider it necessary. One
should note, however, that this does not mean that the government will
force a private oil company to renegotiate an existing license; such
power was never tested. Rather, the government made it clear that it
wanted all operating consortia to renegotiate to give BNOC participa-
tion.326 The government did not threaten on legal grounds those com-
panies which refused to go along, but instead promised that those who
complied would have that fact working to their favor in future discre-
tionary licensing rounds.3 27 Evans has suggested that the critical state
of the British economy and the government's negotiations with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund made it critical that,
nothing should be done that would disrupt the progress of the
oil developments [in the North Sea] and it was for that reason
. . . the most controversial part of [the corporation's] role-
participation in commercial fields discovered under existing
licenses-was put into place by negotiation with the compa-
nies concerned and not through the force of law.328
Although many of the larger companies complained and made negoti-
ations move slowly, overall, the government actually had little trouble
getting companies to agree in principle to participation. Krapels
reported,
324. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
325. See Daintith & Gault, supra note 56, at 41. "[U.K. law] not only admits no explicit
constitutional fetters on Parliament, but also greatly restricts the capacity of Government to fetter
by contract its future executive action." Id
326. See E. K..ps, supra note 109, at 28.
327. Id at 29.
328. Evans, supra note 2.
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All the companies except Amoco had agreed to participa-
tion in principle by the time invitations to the [fifth] Round
were issued in late 1976, but it is likely that most of the com-
panies had resigned themselves to the participation principle
once the Government made clear its intention to respect their
interest in secure access to oil.329
The companies agreed to one of three different forms of participation,
depending on their needs and position in the British oil scene.330
If one is willing to concede that the British could change the condi-
tions under which oil companies operate, the next step of inquiry, in an
analysis of legal stability, is whether there is a degree of predictability
and justification for the country's actions. Here again, changes in the
international petroleum arena gave the emergence of state participation
in the United Kingdom an "air of inevitability." 331
There are several factors that indicate that the creation of BNOC
was an event that oil companies could have anticipated. First, Daintith
and Gault describe state participation as fitting a pattern found around
the world.
The general tenor of the developments in domestic policy
here described is a familiar one in the context of oil company-
Government relations the world over. Government policy is
at first directed to attracting the interest of the companies and
persuading them to commit their resources to the task of ex-
tracting oil within its territory. Once that commitment is ob-
tained, and fortified by success, the terms on which the
companies are required to operate are progressively made
329. E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 29.
330. Id at 29-30. Negotiation between BNOC and companies began in 1975 and agreements
were entered in principle with all, including the recalcitrant Amoco, by spring of 1977. There
were primarily three types of agreements:
1. Varying amounts of equity shares are held by BNOC in consortia whose membership
include Conoco, Arco, Total, Shell, Marathon, Elf, and Chevron. This is the highest form of
ownership for BNOC.
2. BNOC is given an unrestricted option to purchase 51% of the oil produced from licenses
that include Stratfjord, Heather, Thistle, Claymore and Piper fields. This was particularly popular
to the government because it permitted BNOC to choose which operations it wanted to invest in,
giving the government more control over supply.
3. BNOC holds a restricted option to purchase 51% of the oil produced in fields being devel-
oped by major U.K. refining companies (including British Petroleum, Shell, Esso, Texaco, Mobil,
Amoco and Chevron). Id; see United Kingdor" Full Buy-Back Rights for Shell and Esso, 44
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 69, 69 (1977). Shell and Esso negotiated a deal with BNOC whereby
they would sell the corporation its 51%, but subject to a right for Shell and Esso to buy that entire
amount back at the same price "as long as they can show that the oil is needed to support their
UK refining and marketing commitments." Id
331. Woodlifre, supra note 17, at 269.
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more onerous and State control of operations is progressively
tightened.332
In Britain, the report by the Committee on Public Accounts con-
cluded that the oil companies had in fact been given too good a deal,
and this helped to stimulate the government to seek controls over the
oil industry.333 Second, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 created an
awareness in Britain that the nation really had no security of supply.
Despite the government's owning forty-eight percent of British Petro-
leum, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath was quite upset to
learn from British Petroleum management that it would not favor any
particular buyer, in this case, Britain, in allocating its supply, but in-
stead would honor its contracts on an international basis.3 34 In other
words, the government would not be able to order the company to give
Britain a greater share of its oil. 3 5 Although most Conservatives were
not to endorse the BNOC plan, they too recognized that British Petro-
leum would not be the supply solution if Britain were to enter another
oil crisis. 3 36 The incident further increased the calls for a truly British
representative in the international oil scene. Finally, it should have
been recognized that unlike the situation in the United States, public
corporations had long been considered to play viable roles in the Brit-
ish economy. Given the right circumstances, a national oil company
could be as attractive as a national gas company or airline.
As soon as controlling oil became a major issue in Britain, it did
not take long to bring BNOC into effect. In the 1974 election, which
returned the Labour Party to power under Harold Wilson, securing for
the British a greater share of the North Sea wealth was an important
issue. Soon after taking control, the Labour Government issued its
"White Paper" policy statement on the British oil industry.3 37 In the
Paper, the main problems facing the United Kingdom were identified
as the nation's not getting enough of the North Sea successes and the
332. Daintith & Gault, supra note 56, at 38.
333. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
334. We've got ours, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1976, at 55.
335. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 17.
336. See We'vegot ours, supra note 334, at 55. According to BNOC Chairman Lord Kearton,
"Heath found that British Petroleum [though 48% government-owned] was not a national com-
pany but an international one. No government could live if in another oil crisis it had to say,
'What happens to the oil is beyond our control."' Id
337. See E. KRAPELs, supra note 109, at 18 (citing the "White Paper," UNITED KINGDOM
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS POLICY, CMD. 5696 (1974), reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 460
(1975)).
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effect of rising oil prices.338 The result, it said, "is that North Sea licen-
sees would reap enormous and uncovenanted profits on their invest-
ment. 339  In rectifying this situation to attain a "more equitable
arrangement. . . for the benefit of the nation," the Paper set out five
ways to secure more profits and assert greater control:
1. Enact a new taxation bill to close the loopholes that oil
companies had discovered;
2. Require future licenses to provide for state participation
on a carried interest basis;
3. Renegotiate existing licenses to include participation;
4. Establish a British National Oil Corporation;
5. Permit the Government to control the rate of production
in the U.K. sector.3"
Within a year, legislation was passed.34' Debate over establishing the
BNOC drew much attention. Conservatives opposed it for many of the
traditional reasons that face public corporations; that it furthered so-
cialism, 342 that it would be inefficient,343 that it would not be able to
pay well enough to attract quality personnel, 344 and that it would dis-
place private capital.345 However, when many of these same Conserva-
tives came to power in 1979, their opposition to BNOC had softened.
In its three and one-half years of existence, BNOC had developed a
strong position in the British oil scene. Through its combination of
equity, participation, and crude oil royalty payments, BNOC had be-
come the largest seller of crude oil in the North Sea.346 Thus, rather
than trying to abolish BNOC, the Conservatives began modifying its
powers, putting it in much the same position as companies in the pri-
vate sector. The result has been that this form of state participation has
not had the radical effect that many oil companies initially feared.
Supporters of BNOC today remain convinced that the British
form of state participation in the oil industry offers oil companies the
best deal in the world.34 7 Undoubtedly the flagship of British partici-
338. UNrrE KINGDOM OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS POLICY, CMD. 5696, cl. 4 (1974).
339. Id
340. Id c. 5.
341. See E. KRAPELS, supra note 109, at 20.
342. Id (quoting Conservative Party spokesman for Energy, Patrick Jenkins, who stated that
"majority state participation is no more than the ugly unacceptable face of socialism").
343. Id Critics claimed it would be like the Postal Service.
344. Id
345. Id
346. See Forster & Zillman, supra note 275, at 77-78.
347. Evans, supra note 116.
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pation was the promise by Labour's Secretary of State for Energy, Eric
Varley, that financially oil companies shall be "no better and no worse
off," and that a "profitable role" will continue for the private oil indus-
try in Britain.3
4 8
In the final analysis regarding the question of whether Britain of-
fers a stable legal environment, commentators have argued that, rela-
tive to other producing nations, there is stability and security in the
British system. Daintith and Gault compare Britain to Norway, which
provides constitutional protection for private individuals prohibiting
the government to give retroactive effect to changes in legislation, and
they conclude that, despite the lack of such safeguards in the United
Kingdom, the British offer just as much legal security.349 Unlike Nor-
wegian legislation, which tends to be vaguely drawn and susceptible to
broad interpretation, the British legislation is tediously specific and
leaves little room for unexpected interpretations. Thus, even if British
legislation may be unilateral and overturn previous contracts, it is al-
ways subject to legislative action.35 ° Since the United Kingdom guar-
antees an open democratic process, the companies always have an
opportunity to be represented. Compared to the process found in most
producing nations, the British offer a stable, though not absolute, sys-
tem of legal security.
348. See E. KRALs, supra note 109, at 21.
349. See Daintith & Gault, supra note 56, at 39.
350. See id. at 41.
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